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Copyright protection attaches to an original work of expression the
moment it is created and fixed in a tangible medium. Yet modern
copyright law contains no viable mechanism by which to examine
whether someone is causally responsible for the creation and fixation of
the work. Whenever the issue of causation arises, copyright law relies on
its preexisting doctrinal devices to resolve the issue, in the process
cloaking its intuitions about causation in altogether extraneous
considerations. This Article argues that copyright law embodies an
unstated yet distinct theory of authorial causation, which connects the
element of human agency to a work of expression using the myriad goals
and objectives of the copyright system. This theory of causation would be
best realized through an independent requirement—copyrightable
causation—that the creator of a work must satisfy in order to qualify as
its author for copyright protection. Tracking authorial causation, the
requirement would embody both a factual dimension (creation in fact)
and a normative component (legal creation). The former would exam-
ine the connection between the work and the putative author as a purely
epistemic matter, while the latter would do so through an evaluative
understanding of copyright’s myriad goals and policies. The Article
unpacks the structural and substantive foundations of authorial
causation in copyright law and argues that making causation an
explicit requirement for protection would introduce a measure of
coherence and rationality into the question of copyrightability while
simultaneously allowing copyright law to overtly affirm and promote its
various institutional ideals.
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INTRODUCTION
What is the nature and quantum of human agency needed for
someone to claim copyright in an original work of expression? At first
glance, this question may seem overly metaphysical; yet in reality, it
represents one of modern copyright law’s enduring anomalies. Consider
the controversy involving the photograph commonly described as “the
monkey selfie.”1 In this episode, a wildlife photographer, David Slater,
1. See Danny Cevallos, Opinion, When a Monkey Takes a Selfie . . ., CNN (Aug. 18,
2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/08/opinion/cevallos-monkey-selfie-copyright/ [http:
//perma.cc/A2CQ-EALS]; Samuel Gibbs, Monkey Business: Macaque Selfie Can’t Be
Copyrighted, Say US and UK, Guardian (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2014/aug/22/monkey-business-macaque-selfie-cant-be-copyrighted-say-us-and-
uk [http://perma.cc/M6HT-VLUZ]; Alexis Kleinman, Wikipedia Is in a Pretty Weird Battle
over a Monkey Selfie, Huffington Post (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2014/08/06/monkey-selfie_n_5654752.html [http://perma.cc/G7GK-DQTR]; Olivier
Laurent, Monkey Selfie Lands Photographer in Legal Quagmire, Time (Aug. 6, 2014),
http://time.com/3393645/monkey-selfie-lands-photographer-in-legal-quagmire/ [http:
//perma.cc/S34F-FSS4]; Louise Stewart, Wikimedia Says When a Monkey Takes a Selfie, No
One Owns It, Newsweek (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/lawyers-dispute-
wikimedias-claims-about-monkey-selfie-copyright-265961 [http://perma.cc/TD37-YYZR];
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spent several days in Indonesia following a group of macaque monkeys
and photographing their behavior.2 At one point during the trip, Slater
left his camera on its tripod, set the lens to autofocus, and moved away,
hoping that the monkeys would approach it and give him a close-up
view.3 Soon enough, a group of monkeys came by and started looking at
the reflective lens of the camera.4 Unexpectedly, one monkey began
pressing the camera’s buttons and ended up taking a self-photograph—
that is, a “selfie.”5 Did Slater create the photograph, qualifying him as its
author? His general intention was to photograph the monkeys in close
proximity.6 He certainly provided all the equipment, set it all up appro-
priately, and anticipated that the monkeys would approach the camera.7
Just as Slater was contemplating bringing suit against a website that
posted the photograph without his permission, the Copyright Office
clarified its rules and eliminated the possibility of protection for the
work, concluding that to be eligible for protection, a work “must be
created by a human being.”8 In what appeared to be a direct rebuke to
Slater’s claim, it further clarified that a photograph “lack[ed] human
authorship” when it was “taken by a monkey.”9 The Copyright Office was
Jordan Weissmann, If a Monkey Takes a Selfie, Who Owns the Copyright?, Slate: Moneybox
(Aug. 6, 2014, 6:03 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2014/08/06/monkey
_selfie_who_owns_the_copyright.html [http://perma.cc/3TGT-DX95].
2. See Sulawesi Macaques . . ., DJS Photography, http://www.djsphotography.co.uk/
Tropical%20Forests/Sulawesi%20Macaques.htm [http://perma.cc/P2GU-DK9K] (last vis-
ited Sept. 12, 2016).
3. Id. As Slater described the episode:
I wanted to keep my new found friends happy and with me. I now
wanted to get right in their faces with a wide angle lens, but that was
proving too difficult as they were nervous of something - I couldn’t tell
what. So I put my camera on a tripod with a very wide angle lens, settings
configured such as predictive autofocus, motorwind, even a flashgun, to
give me a chance of a facial close up if they were to approach again for a
play. I duly moved away and bingo, they moved in, fingering the toy,
pressing the buttons and fingering the lens . . . . They played with the
camera until of course some images were inevitably taken! I had one
hand on the tripod when this was going on, but I was being prodded and
poked by would be groomers and a few playful juveniles who nibbled at




6. Id. (“I now wanted to get right in their faces with a wide angle lens.”).
7. See id.
8. U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices § 313.2
(3d ed. 2014) [hereinafter U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium]; see also David McAfee,
Copyright Office Says It Will Not Register ‘Monkey Selfie,’ Law360 (Aug. 22, 2014, 8:15 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/570432/copyright-office-says-it-will-not-register-monkey-selfie
[http://perma.cc/UZA2-G2VN] (reporting on the new revision to the Compendium in the
context of Slater’s “monkey selfie” controversy).
9. U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium, supra note 8, § 313.2.
4 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 117:1
thereby suggesting that while Slater played some role in the creation of
the photograph, that role was insufficient to make him its author, since
the real creator of the work was the monkey.10 Even though the work
itself met all the formal requirements of copyrightability, the rules
presumptively denied Slater and the work protection because Slater’s
failure to press the shutter button himself rendered him ineligible to be
characterized as the author of the photograph.11 In other words, this
failure was treated as having broken his causal connection to the work.
Modern copyright law accords protection to a work automatically,
from the instant that the work is created and fixed in a “tangible medium
of expression.”12 In the absence of any formal scrutiny of the work prior
to its obtaining protection, copyright law all too readily presumes author-
ship of the work and subjects the authorial status of a claimant to exami-
nation only when disputed.13 When copyright law chooses to address the
question of authorship, it focuses on whether the expression at issue
qualifies as a “work of authorship” rather than on the process of author-
ing the work.14 Authorship in this stylized conception originates entirely
in the formal doctrinal prerequisites that a work needs to satisfy, such as
10. Indeed, this reasoning formed the basis for the court’s decision in a lawsuit
brought by People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, which asserted that the macaque
was the author of the work and could qualify for copyright ownership under the law. See
Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-cv-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016).
The court dismissed the lawsuit, concluding that “works created by animals are not
entitled to copyright protection.” Id. at *4.
11. See James Eng, Monkey Selfie Can’t Be Copyrighted, U.S. Regulators Confirm,
NBC News (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/monkey-selfie-
cant-be-copyrighted-u-s-regulators-confirm-n186296 [http://perma.cc/S7MV-769P]; see
also Jason Abbruzzese, U.S. Copyright Office: Photos Taken by a Monkey Can’t Be
Copyrighted, Mashable (Aug. 21, 2014), http://mashable.com/2014/08/21/no-copyright-
for-monkey-god-photos/#KGj1dd9wqqq7 [http://perma.cc/HRN8-AQ8L].
12. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012); Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57
Stan. L. Rev. 485, 487–88 (2004) (“Under current law, copyright arises the moment an
original piece of expression is fixed . . . .”).
13. Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 304 (7th Cir. 2011) (“In the ordinary
copyright case, authorship and fixation are not contested; most works presented for
copyright are unambiguously authored and unambiguously fixed.”). For examples of this
approach, see Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 699 (2d Cir. 2013) (presuming without
further examination authorship of a book of photographs taken by the plaintiff); Harney
v. Sony Pictures Television, Inc., 704 F.3d 173, 176–77 (1st Cir. 2013) (presuming the
plaintiff’s authorship of a photograph). In the latter of these cases, the court acknowl-
edged that ownership of the copyright was “undisputed,” id. at 182, suggesting that the
same logic extended to the authorship question too.
14. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (using the phrase “work[] of authorship” to describe
expression that is eligible for copyright protection). For a useful discussion of how this
emphasis on authorship through the work and the conditions of copyrightability came to
be, see Russ VerSteeg, Defining “Author” for Purposes of Copyright, 45 Am. U. L. Rev.
1323, 1326–33 (1996).
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the originality requirement15 and the idea–expression dichotomy.16 This
is true even though the term “authorship” suggests a particular form,
type, and amount of agency underlying the creative process that leads to
the work’s creation.17 This endogenous construction of authorship and its
fragmented understanding through the individual components of
copyrightability collectively disable any direct scrutiny of the causal
connection between an individual’s actions and the production of the
creative work. The law always presumes a (human) cause for copyright
protection once the work itself is found to be protectable, with individu-
alized proof of causation being unnecessary.18 What made the monkey-
selfie episode controversial, then, was the Copyright Office’s overt
recognition that authorship was more than just a formal matter and that
it embodied an important causal dimension.19
Despite its growth to encompass a broad array of creative works and
processes,20 copyright jurisprudence has failed to develop a mechanism
for assessing when someone is causally responsible for the creative
expression that is to be protected. Modern efforts to understand copy-
right’s commitment to the ideal of authorship invariably border on the
metaphysical in their attempts to understand the construct of the
“author” in the abstract and thereby routinely elide the centrality of
causation (and causal responsibility) in determining when and how
someone ought to be treated as the author of a particular work of expres-
sion already brought into existence.21 Not only does this lie in stark
15. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991)
(explaining the originality requirement).
16. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (codifying the idea–expression dichotomy).
17. For an overview of the authorship discourse in copyright law and its inadequacies,
see James D.A. Boyle, The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the Framers, 37 Am. U.
L. Rev. 625 (1988) [hereinafter Boyle, Shakespeare and the Framers]; Oren Bracha, The
Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in Early American
Copyright, 118 Yale L.J. 186 (2008); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in
Comparative Copyright Law, 52 DePaul L. Rev. 1063 (2003); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory
of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship,” 1991 Duke L.J. 455 [hereinafter Jaszi,
Toward a Theory of Copyright].
18. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (offering protection to works of authorship and then
categorizing “works of authorship” based on works but not authorship).
19. See U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium, supra note 8, § 313.2 (using the
phrases “created by,” “produced by,” and “taken by,” which have causal undertones, to
describe human authorship).
20. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (listing the multiple categories of works that obtain
protection under copyright); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665 (noting that the categories in § 102(a) are “very broad”).
21. See, e.g., Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright, supra note 17, at 456 (attempting
to “deconstruct” authorship in copyright law using literary theory); Martha Woodmansee,
The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the
‘Author,’ 17 Eighteenth-Century Stud. 425, 426–48 (1984) (using literary history to explain
the emergence of the author in copyright). For two efforts that adopt a more pragmatic
focus on the process of authoring a work, see Alan L. Durham, The Random Muse:
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contrast to other areas of law in which the jurisprudence overtly
addresses questions of causation,22 but it also lies in contrast to copy-
right’s own treatment of liability (for infringement), in which courts have
come to see causation as an integral element of the analysis.23 If copy-
right law and authorship do indeed embody a causal element—as one
would expect, given their focus on creative behavior—the element is well
hidden behind a cascade of copyright’s other intuitions and beliefs.24
Everyday scenarios of creative production that routinely give rise to
potential claims of authorship embody important questions of causation.
And yet, copyright law chooses to address the question of causation only
indirectly (and begrudgingly).25 Consider an artist who accidentally
knocks over a palette of paints to produce a visually appealing design on
a nearby canvas that belongs to someone else,26 or a translator who, while
attempting to decipher an ancient text, makes creative choices during
the process that render the translation fairly distinct.27 Should the artist
or the translator—in either instance—be treated as the author of the
resulting work, rendering it eligible for protection? In the normal course
of things, copyright law attempts to analyze the issue through the
doctrine of “originality,” which asks whether the work was independently
created and embodies a minimal amount of creativity that derives from
Authorship and Indeterminacy, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 569 (2002); David Nimmer,
Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and Originality, 38 Hous. L. Rev. 1 (2001)
[hereinafter Nimmer, Dead Sea Scrolls]. Neither, however, appreciates the role or signifi-
cance of causation in the authorship determination, and they both inevitably revert to
understanding authorship in terms of its normative significance for copyright. See infra
notes 59–63 and accompanying text.
22. See H.L.A. Hart & Tony Honoré, Causation in the Law 130–32 (2d ed. 1985)
(discussing the ubiquity of causal ideas in tort law, contract law, and criminal law); Michael
S. Moore, Causation and Responsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals, and Metaphysics 3
(2009) [hereinafter Moore, Causation and Responsibility] (discussing the unifying
conception of causation in the areas of tort and criminal law). Tort law is of course the
area in which the jurisprudence of causation is best developed today. See, e.g., Leon
Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 543, 545 (1962);
Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 1735, 1737 (1985).
23. See CoStar Grp. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004); Religious
Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal.
1995).
24. See infra Parts I–II (describing how courts usually address causal questions only
through other copyright doctrines).
25. See infra Parts I–II.
26. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951)
(concluding that an “unintentional[]” variation remains copyrightable if subsequently
“adopt[ed]” by the author).
27. These were the facts of the well-known Dead Sea Scrolls case. See Michael D.
Birnhack, The Dead Sea Scrolls Case: Who Is an Author, 23 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 128, 128
(2001).
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the claimant.28 Originality, however, remains a rather poor fit for the
causal question, given that it focuses almost entirely on the work itself
rather than on the process of creation.29 Copyright law treats the author’s
intentionality—or lack thereof—as irrelevant to the originality deter-
mination, which is satisfied as long as the work itself exhibits a “modicum
of creativity.”30 By refusing to address the core questions at issue in these
scenarios for what they really are—questions of causal responsibility—
copyright law in effect conceals its account of causation and presumes it
to be altogether uncontroversial.
This Article argues that copyright law embodies a latent theory of
causation, seen in early attempts to construct the “author” for specific
categories of work31 and today hidden behind doctrinal proxies that
perform other roles.32 Unsurprisingly, copyright’s account of causation
embodies an important normative dimension, intricately connected to
the various contested goals and objectives of copyright protection, which
is perhaps responsible for causation’s dormant existence. Several of copy-
right law’s modern doctrines embody snippets of this account of causa-
tion, but scholars have rarely understood these doctrinal devices as
related to causation. Recognizing that the overt acknowledgment of
causation’s place in copyright law would better serve the law, this Article
proposes an independent causation requirement that plaintiffs would
have to prove as part of their prima facie cases. Here, as elsewhere, the
workings of the common law provide important insights into how
copyright law might realize this requirement.33
Ever since the advent of legal realism as the dominant approach to
legal analysis,34 scholars have come to see the identification of an act as a
28. 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 2.01[A],
LexisNexis (database updated June 2016) (discussing copyright’s “originality” require-
ment). For a general overview of the connection between originality and authorship, see
Nimmer, Dead Sea Scrolls, supra note 21, at 13 (noting authorship has come to be
understood as synonymous with origination); see also Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 1078
(“‘[O]riginality’ is synonymous with authorship.”).
29. 1 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 28, § 2A.08[E][3][a][i] (observing elements of
originality must “manifest themselves in the work of expression itself” rather than the
“process”).
30. Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 1085–88. Professor David Nimmer has argued that
intentionality ought to be the basis for authorship. See Nimmer, Dead Sea Scrolls, supra
note 21, at 204–10.
31. See infra Part I.
32. See infra Part II.
33. It is worth noting at the outset that the argument in this Article concerns itself
exclusively with authorship theory and doctrine as understood in U.S. copyright law,
leaving for follow-up work the exploration of how authorship in other jurisdictions,
especially civil law countries, embodies different ideas of causation.
34. See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 465, 467 (1988)
(reviewing Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale 1927–1960 (1986)) (“All major current
schools of [legal] thought are, in significant ways, products of legal realism.”); see also
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“cause” of an event or outcome as intricately connected to the enterprise
of regulating the consequences of that determination, rather than as a
purely neutral description of reality.35 Causation in the law thus embodies
an unquestionably normative dimension, albeit one that is superimposed
on factual criteria.36 Identifying an antecedent event as a “cause” of a
legally relevant outcome involves a determination that there is both a
factual connection between that event and the outcome and a norma-
tively desirable reason for recognizing that event as legally significant in
light of the law’s goals and purposes for the area involved.37
In a similar vein, developing a requirement of “copyrightable
causation” as a prerequisite to copyright protection would serve copy-
right jurisprudence well.38 Copyrightable causation would require deter-
mining whether the causal antecedent that the putative author or
claimant is relying on as the act of creation represents the precise type,
form, and quantum of creative input that copyright law should—as a
factual and normative matter—deem significant for entry into its system
of exclusive rights.39 Much like other aspects of copyrightability, copy-
rightable causation would constitute a part of the plaintiff’s prima facie
case for a claim of infringement and embody two separate elements. The
first element, “creation in fact,” would examine whether an actor’s partic-
ipation in the creative process contributed as a factual matter to the
production of the creative expression.40 The second component, “legal
Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 Tex. L.
Rev. 267, 267 (1997) (recognizing the “enormous influence Legal Realism has exercised
upon American law and legal education over the last sixty years” and referring to the
statement “we are all realists now” as a “cliché”). Professor Brian Leiter also notes that
legal realism is “omnipresent in American law schools and legal culture.” Id. at 274. For a
general overview of legal realism, see Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale 1927–1960, at
3–5 (1986) (describing the belief that abstract rules and concepts do not decide cases as a
central feature of the theory); L.L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. Pa. L. Rev. 429,
431–37 (1934) (describing the theory as being about the expansion of legitimate sources
for adjudication in the law, among other things).
35. See, e.g., Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 60, 61–64
(1956) (explaining how a seemingly factual determination as to causation is nevertheless
“affected by the purpose” that the fact-finder “seek[s] to serve”); see also Leon Green, Are
There Dependable Rules of Causation?, 77 U. Pa. L. Rev. 601, 604–06 (1929) (describing a
similar conflation of fact and policy) [hereinafter Green, Dependable Rules].
36. The best-known exposition of this normative dimension exists in tort law, in
which the law distinguishes between cause in fact and proximate cause. See Guido
Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 69, 71–73 (1975). For a broader overview of proximate cause, see generally
Leon Green, Rationale for Proximate Cause (1924) [hereinafter Green, Proximate
Cause].
37. See Calabresi, supra note 36, at 100–01 (discussing how the mixed goals of tort
law can explain different types of causation).
38. See infra Part III.
39. See infra Part III.
40. See infra section III.B.
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creation,” would then ask whether the contribution—so proven to
exist—is significant enough when viewed in light of copyright’s purposes
(i.e., normatively) to generate protection and authorship.41 The appli-
cation of this requirement to different areas of creativity should produce
varying standards, in turn reflective of copyright’s goals and purposes for
those areas.42
Incorporating a copyrightable-causation requirement into copyright
law would also add substantive content to copyright’s purported—and
constitutionally enshrined43—commitment to authorship. Scholars today
understand authorship to be a largely amorphous idea within copyright
law—one that plays a symbolic and expressive role rather than an
analytical one.44 This reality is confirmed by the surprising absence of any
meaningful discussion of the idea within copyright case law. A
copyrightable-causation requirement would allow copyright doctrine to
disaggregate the idea of authoring a work of expression and enable a
more detailed examination of that process.45 The requirement would
thereby bring into sharp focus the act—rather than just the result—of
authorship and move copyright doctrine and thinking away from its
singular emphasis on the “work.”46 Authorship would in the process re-
emerge not just as a symbolic ideal within the system but also as a sub-
stantive feature of copyright doctrine that plays a significant role in
determining claimants’ rights.47 The copyrightable-causation require-
ment would thereby emphasize that causation is the sine qua non of
authorship.
While copyright law is statutory in origin as a purely formal matter,
much of the modern American copyright system nonetheless consists of
rules and principles developed by courts incrementally and contextually
in common law fashion. These rules, best described as the federal
common law of copyright, augment the statutory text, a reality that courts
41. See infra section III.C.
42. See infra section III.C (describing how so-called “midlevel principles” could
inform the legal-creation inquiry).
43. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (empowering Congress to grant certain exclusive
rights to “Authors”).
44. Bracha, supra note 17, at 188–89 & n.4 (describing this trend in American
copyright scholarship).
45. See infra Part III (proposing a structured framework for courts to examine
whether a claimant has satisfied copyrightable causation).
46. See infra Part III (recommending a shift toward emphasis on the process that
leads to a work’s creation rather than just the product of that process).
47. For a discussion of the current role of authorship—as a symbol—in copyright law,
see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Folklore and Symbolism of Authorship in American
Copyright Law, 54 Hous. L. Rev. 403 (2016).
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and scholars have come to see as uncontroversial.48 Indeed, Congress has
incorporated large parts of this federal common law into the text of the
Copyright Act itself, effectively restating the rules in statutory form.49 The
copyrightable-causation requirement proposed herein would be a
valuable addition to this body of law, and given the requirement’s
connection to the common law of torts, courts would be best positioned
to develop it. Additionally, the requirement would need to work in
tandem with the law’s existing requirement of originality, an established
feature of the common law of copyright,50 giving federal courts a logical
and prudential reason to develop it without congressional intervention.51
Parts I and II of this Article unpack copyright’s dormant theory of
authorial causation. Part I looks to early case law, in which courts
grappled with the nature and quantum of human agency required for
classification as an author of a work, and argues that this early jurispru-
dence reveals an unacknowledged commitment to understanding auth-
orship in causal terms. Part II provides an overview of copyright law’s
modern treatment of authorial causation. It analyzes how courts have
routinely deployed several of copyright’s current doctrinal devices to
mask what are essentially questions of causation, undermining the
analytical coherence of copyright doctrine. Part III then moves to the
prescriptive and introduces an independent element of copyrightability
48. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Stewarding the Common Law of Copyright, 60 J.
Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 103, 108–16 (2013) [hereinafter Balganesh, Stewarding]
(discussing this development within copyright jurisprudence).
49. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining the term “joint work”); id. § 102(a)
(requiring a work of authorship to be “original”); id. § 107 (codifying the “fair use”
doctrine).
50. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“The sine
qua non of copyright is originality.”).
51. Depending on one’s view of the role of courts in the U.S. legal system, one might
worry that any addition to the federal common law of copyright vests courts with
additional discretion and that this discretion may be subject to abuse and inconsistent
application. However, this concern overlooks some of the key features of the institutional
framework underlying copyright law. In 1976, Congress consciously chose to avoid
codifying several copyright doctrines that had been developed in common law style by
courts, thereby implicitly recognizing that the Copyright Act was at least in part (and
perhaps in significant part) a common law statute. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 51
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664 (noting how the doctrine of originality
was “purposely left undefined . . . [and] intended to incorporate without change the
standard of originality established by the courts under the [previous] copyright statute”);
Balganesh, Stewarding, supra note 48, at 108–10; Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Debunking
Blackstonian Copyright, 118 Yale L.J. 1126, 1167–68 (2009) (reviewing Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox (2008)) [hereinafter Balganesh, Debunking Blackstonian
Copyright] (arguing the Copyright Act is “structured largely as a common law enact-
ment”). Indeed, recent developments, such as the American Law Institute’s new project
attempting to restate the federal law of copyright, suggest a general willingness to embrace
the role of courts in copyright reform. See Restatement of the Law, Copyright, Am. Law
Inst., http://www.ali.org/projects/show/copyright/ [http://perma.cc/V3TQ-STXC] (last
visited Sept. 12, 2016).
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that focuses on causation—“copyrightable causation”—and unpacks its
elements. Drawing on the understanding of causation in tort law, this
Part shows how copyrightable causation should be seen as embodying
both a descriptive and a normative dimension in its application to
individual cases. Part IV considers a few possible extensions and applica-
tions of the copyrightable-causation requirement.
A caveat is in order before proceeding further. As should be appar-
ent from the following discussion, the principal impetus for this Article’s
proposal for an overt copyrightable-causation requirement is the recogni-
tion that the ideas underlying the requirement are already dormant
within copyright jurisprudence and thinking. Consequently, the require-
ment is not designed to exclude some forms of expression from protec-
tion or to bring certain others under the umbrella of copyrightability. In
actual practice, the requirement is unlikely to alter the boundaries of
copyrightability in any significant manner. Rather, a copyrightable-
causation requirement would streamline the system’s current rationale
and better articulate the myriad ideas that are currently concealed within
the concept of authorship.
I. AUTHORSHIP AS CAUSATION
Copyright’s construction of authorship has long embodied an
important causal element. This Part attempts to trace the contours of
copyright’s dormant theory of authorial causation. Section I.A first looks
to early copyright jurisprudence involving nontraditional settings of
creative production, in which courts have grappled with the issue of
causation when determining a work’s authorship. Section I.B then dis-
cusses how this jurisprudence strove to articulate a focus on the nature
and quantum of human agency needed for authorship.
A. The Author as Cause
The author has always been the principal subject of copyright
protection. The Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution
enables Congress to enact a copyright law to secure exclusive rights in
writings to “Authors.”52 Similarly, the Statute of Anne, the first modern
copyright statute, vested in “the Author of any Book . . . the sole Right
and Liberty” of printing and distributing the book and its contents.53
Over the last several decades, scholars have spent a significant amount of
time and effort trying to understand how, why, and when copyright
thinking came to embrace this overbearing emphasis on the author, as
well as the consequences of this emphasis for copyright jurisprudence.
One prominent school of thought locates the origins of this emphasis in
52. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
53. Copyright Act 1709 (Statute of Anne), 8 Ann. c. 21 (Gr. Brit.) (repealed 1842).
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the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, by which time scholars believe
an enlightenment-driven, individualistic conception of creativity
emerged—influencing copyright law and policy for several subsequent
decades.54 Another more recent school of thought argues that the prior
account is largely incomplete with respect to American copyright law and
that conceptions of authorship came to be firmly embedded in copyright
doctrine only during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.55
While a good amount of scholarship has focused on unpacking the
construct of the “author” in copyright law, there appears to be surpris-
ingly little discussion of what the process of authoring entails concep-
tually as a matter of copyright law, theory, and policy.56 Scholars have
generally taken authorship to be about understanding the structure,
motivation, status, and ideological currency of the author rather than as
an effort to understand and unpack the particular process through which
the author generates the work that eventually becomes the object of the
protection.57 Even when they do discuss authorship as a process, they
54. See, e.g., James Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law and Construction of
the Information Society 58 (1996); Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of
Copyright 1–3 (1993); Boyle, Shakespeare and the Framers, supra note 17, at 629; Jaszi,
Toward a Theory of Copyright, supra note 17, at 455–56. See generally The Construction
of Authorship: Textual Appropriation in Law and Literature (Martha Woodmansee &
Peter Jaszi eds., 1994) [hereinafter The Construction of Authorship] (presenting a
collection of essays that explore the social, cultural, and legal construction of authorship);
Bracha, supra note 17, at 192–97 (discussing U.S. copyright law’s treatment of authorship
in the nineteenth century).
55. Bracha, supra note 17, at 192 (noting these accounts are “incomplete or even
flawed”).
56. But see Dan L. Burk, Method and Madness in Copyright Law, 2007 Utah L. Rev.
587, 597–602 (discussing the importance of the process of creation in copyright); Nimmer,
Dead Sea Scrolls, supra note 21, at 158–212 (developing a theory of authorship that
focuses on intentionality).
In recent times, the issues of computer-generated creativity and artificial intelligence
have brought greater attention to the question of what authoring involves. Professor
Annemarie Bridy, one of the earliest scholars to examine the deficiencies inherent in
American copyright law’s treatment of artificial intelligence, suggested using a dichotomy
of “author-in-law” and “author-in-fact” to address the issue. See Annemarie Bridy, Coding
Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author, Stan. Tech. L. Rev., no. 5,
2012, at 1, 24–27, http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/kernochan/
09.materials-Bridy.pdf [http://perma.cc/9L9R-M2HX]. In her discussion, Bridy notes—in
passing—that courts occasionally associate authorship with causation. See id. at 5 & n.23.
For more recent work examining computer-generated creativity, see James Grimmelmann,
Copyright for Literate Robots, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 657, 661–74 (2016) [hereinafter
Grimmelmann, Copyright for Literate Robots]; James Grimmelmann, There’s No Such
Thing as a Computer-Authored Work—and It’s a Good Thing, Too, 39 Colum. J.L. & Arts
403, 409–16 (2016) [hereinafter Grimmelmann, No Such Thing].
57. See, e.g., Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright, supra note 17, at 456 (using
literary theory to describe the concept of authorship as “ideologically charged”); Martha
Woodmansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, in The Construction of
Authorship, supra note 54, at 15, 15–28 (explaining how popular notions of the author as
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invariably treat the question as driven in significant part by normative
considerations underlying copyright’s construction of authorship, cloud-
ing its analytical basis.58
Professor Alan Durham, for example, argues that “indeterminate
works”—works that are created in some part by forces beyond the will or
control of the author—should receive protection because they are just as
original as other works.59 Building on the idea that authorship in
copyright is defined “in terms of originality,”60 Durham argues that an
indeterminate work merits protection when it is “made” by a human
being, “similar in kind” to other protected works, and under the
“creative control” of the human.61 But this account’s a priori category of
“indeterminate works” assumes away the core of the problem, which its
solution then attempts to artificially remedy. This analysis all too readily
implies that there is indeed a workable basis for maintaining the
determinate–indeterminate distinction, when this distinction is the
source of the problem in the first place. Durham does the same with
works “made” by someone and works under an individual’s “control,” all
in an effort to further a particular normative position (associated with
originality).62 Yet nowhere in this analysis does Durham recognize that
the very ideas of determinacy, control, and the like themselves turn on an
understanding of causation.63
As a practical matter, there is little need for courts to scrutinize an
individual’s contribution to the process of creating the work, given that
the issue appears to be undisputed in the vast majority of cases.64 It is
a solitary individual misunderstand authors’ actual creative processes, which are frequently
collaborative).
58. See, e.g., Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright, supra note 17, at 456–57 (arguing
other understandings of authorship have obfuscated “the actual stakes” underlying
copyright law).
59. Durham, supra note 21, at 573.
60. Id. at 618.
61. Id. at 636.
62. See id.
63. In contrast to Durham, Nimmer argues that authorship in copyright law should
require an intentionality accompanying an author’s behavior. See Nimmer, Dead Sea
Scrolls, supra note 21, at 209–12. Nimmer emphasizes “subjective expression” as critical to
authorship. Id. at 208–09. Leaving aside the normative desirability of Nimmer’s theory, the
fact remains that copyright law does not actively police the subjective intentionality of a
putative author’s actions. See Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 1085. As the rest of this Part will
show, courts have historically been willing to (1) attribute authorship when such intention-
ality remains altogether unproven and (2) deny authorship when intentionality exists but
other forms of connection are seen as missing.
64. See Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 304 (7th Cir. 2011) (“In the ordinary
copyright case, authorship and fixation are not contested; most works presented for
copyright are unambiguously authored and unambiguously fixed.”). The issue is, of
course, a central one in joint-authorship cases. See Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227,
1230–33 (9th Cir. 2000) (addressing the question of the plaintiff’s status as a joint author).
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only when confronted with the need to identify the author of a work by
reference to the author’s actions in bringing the work into existence that
courts become compelled to articulate a theory of authorial causation—
one that links a claimant’s process of creation with the ultimate product
of that process (i.e., the work).65 The historical jurisprudence that
emerged from such situations therefore sheds important light on the
theory of authorial causation that copyright came to embrace66 and later
conceal under various proxies.67
1. Choosing Among Contributors to a Work. — The earliest situations in
which courts confronted the question of authorial causation were cases
in which a claimant (i.e., a putative author) had interacted with others in
the production and creation of the work at issue and sought to be
characterized as its sole author upon completion. These were not
instances of joint authorship, with more than one party claiming to be
the work’s author, but instead situations in which one party claimed to be
the author of the work to the exclusion of all the other contributors.68 These
disputes usually followed a common pattern. One party—the conceiver—
would conceive of the project and its design and thereafter utilize the
services of one or more others to execute specific components of the
project under direction.69 These executors would no doubt produce
expression; yet such expression was decidedly for use in the overall
project.70 The overarching question that courts confronted was whether
the conceiver who designed the project and was responsible for it could
be characterized as its author under copyright law, despite the fact that
others had actually created the project’s individual components.71
In an overwhelming majority of these cases, courts recognized the
conceiver to be the author of the work, even though significant parts of the
65. See infra sections I.A.1–.3 (examining courts’ historical treatment of authorial
causation).
66. See infra sections I.A.1–.3 (surveying courts’ explicit use of causal logic in numer-
ous early authorship cases).
67. See infra Part II (discussing the concealment of authorial causation within the
originality, joint works, and work for hire doctrines).
68. See, e.g., Scott v. Stanford (1867) 3 LR Eq. 718 (Ch) at 718–21 (Eng.).
69. See, e.g., id. at 723 (noting the plaintiff may have had assistance from his
“clerks”).
70. See, e.g., id. (“It appears to me quite immaterial whether he has been assisted in
the compilation by his own clerks, or by those of the Corporation.”).
71. See, e.g., id. at 722–23 (examining whether an officer of a corporation could be
characterized as an author even if his clerks assisted him); see also Eaton v. Lake (1888) 20
QBD 378 at 383–84 (Eng.) (considering whether a musical-composition copyright vested
in a composer or his employer); Hatton v. Kean (1859) 141 Eng. Rep. 819, 823–24; 7
C.B.N.S. 268, 276–77 (examining the authorship of a musical composition commissioned
for a play); Sweet v. Benning (1855) 139 Eng. Rep. 838, 847; 16 C.B. 459, 480–81 (assessing
the respective rights of a periodical owner and a writer employed by the periodical);
Maclean v. Moody (1858) 30 Sc. Jur. 693, 695–98 (Scot.); 20 D. 1154 (exploring whether
the copyright to a shipping list vested in its publishers).
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actual execution came from someone else.72 One prominent nineteenth-
century treatise on English copyright law synthesized the rule to
recognize that “the author is the man from whom emanates the general
conception and design . . . although much of the detail may have been
the work of subordinate brains and hands.”73 In one often-quoted case,
the court observed:
[U]nder the [Statute of Anne], the person who forms the plan,
and who embarks in the speculation of a work, and who
employs various persons to compose different parts of it,
adapted to their own peculiar acquirements,—that he, the
person who so forms the plan and scheme of the work, and pays
different artists of his own selection who upon certain
conditions contribute to it, is the author and proprietor of the
work, if not within the literal expression, at least within the
equitable meaning of the statute of Anne, which, being a
remedial law, is to be construed liberally.74
Central to this conclusion was a finding that the work owed its
origins to its conceiver, since it “emanate[d]” from him.75 When exactly
this connection might be implied was of course far from clear in practice.
Consequently, in situations in which the connection between the
conceiver and the final work appeared more attenuated, courts did not
hesitate to deny authorship status to the conceiver.76 Elaborating on this
strand of thinking, one treatise noted that “[t]he mere suggestion of a
subject or idea which is then entirely designed and executed by another
does not constitute the originator of the idea an author.”77
Scholars have often cited the mid-nineteenth-century case of
Shepherd v. Conquest78 as an example of such a denial.79 The plaintiffs in
that case were the proprietors of a theater who had employed a
playwright to write and adapt two plays for them.80 The proprietors
compensated the playwright for his service and paid him a weekly salary,
72. See, e.g., Scott 3 LR Eq. at 723 (finding plaintiff’s collection of coal data protected
despite assistance from clerks); Hatton 141 Eng. Rep. at 824; 7 C.B.N.S. at 279–80 (holding
that the play’s creator held the copyrights to compositions commissioned for the play);
Sweet 139 Eng. Rep. at 847–48; 16 C.B. at 480–81 (ruling that the owners of a periodical,
rather than its writers, held the copyrights to articles published in the periodical).
73. E.J. Macgillivray, A Treatise upon the Law of Copyright 62 (1902).
74. Hatton 141 Eng. Rep. at 823; 7 C.B.N.S. at 277 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Shepherd v. Conquest (1856) 139 Eng. Rep. 1140, 1147; 17 C.B. 427, 443).
75. Macgillivray, supra note 73, at 62.
76. See, e.g., Eaton 20 QBD at 383–84; Shepherd 139 Eng. Rep. at 1147; 17 C.B. at 444–
45.
77. Macgillivray, supra note 73, at 63.
78. 139 Eng. Rep. 1140; 17 C.B. 427.
79. See, e.g., Eaton S. Drone, A Treatise on the Law of Property in Intellectual
Productions in Great Britain and the United States 247 n.1 (Rothman Reprints, Inc. rprt.
1972) (1879); see also Eaton 20 QBD at 383.
80. See Shepherd 139 Eng. Rep. at 1146; 17 C.B. at 441–42.
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and the playwright eventually produced a dramatic work.81 When the
playwright later assigned the work to the defendant, the plaintiffs
claimed to be authors of the work by virtue of having commissioned it
and having specified the general direction it was to take.82 The court
disagreed, noting that the proprietors had not contributed to the “design
or execution of the work.”83
At first glance, one might interpret the case as having premised its
conclusion on the idea–expression dichotomy—the principle that the
plaintiffs had merely contributed the idea rather than the expression.84
However, the idea–expression dichotomy appeared to be largely irrele-
vant to the court, which faulted the plaintiffs for not having “contributed
an idea.”85 The decision rested instead on the finding that the plaintiffs
had made no contribution of significance to the work beyond “sug-
gest[ing]” its subject.86
According to this understanding, valid authorial causation therefore
required a contribution that was more than a mere suggestion of the
idea. All the same, courts did not require the actual execution or design
of the expression.87 Rather, courts required the contribution to be
compositional—that is, related to the content underlying the work rather
than its mere physical manifestation.88 What made a conceiver an author
was thus her contribution to the composition of the content, even if not
directly to the content (expression) itself. However, the celebrated case
of Walter v. Lane,89 which added an altogether new twist to courts’ early
notion of authorial causation, called this compositional requirement into
question.
Walter v. Lane brought the question of authorial causation to the
forefront in determining authorship. The case involved a series of
speeches given by a public personality.90 Several reporters attended these
speeches and took handwritten notes of the speeches in shorthand.91
81. See id. at 1141; 17 C.B. at 429.
82. See id. at 1141–42; 17 C.B. at 428–30.
83. Id. at 1147; 17 C.B. at 445.
84. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (codifying the idea–expression dichotomy in U.S.
copyright law); Julie E. Cohen et al., Copyright in a Global Information Economy 90 (4th
ed. 2015) (explaining the idea–expression dichotomy generally).
85. Shepherd 139 Eng. Rep. at 1147; 17 C.B. at 445.
86. Id. at 1147; 17 C.B. at 445 (“[N]o such effect can be produced where the em-
ployer merely suggests the subject.”).
87. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text (noting courts often recognized
the work’s “conceiver” as the author “even though significant parts of the actual execution
came from someone else”).
88. See supra notes 72–86 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ emphasis on a
connection between the contribution and the design of the work).
89. [1900] AC 539 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.).
90. Id. at 545.
91. Id. at 551.
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They thereafter “wrote the descriptive parts of their reports” and
“corrected and revised and punctuated” the speech transcriptions for
publication in the London newspaper the Times, which claimed to carry
the verbatim text of the original speeches.92 The defendant later copied
these speeches and disputed the authorial status of the reporters, argu-
ing that the reporters had not produced an “original composition” given
that they had transcribed “verbatim reports” of the speech.93
The House of Lords found for the plaintiffs, concluding that the
reporters were indeed the authors of the work that they had tran-
scribed.94 To the court, the work did not have to be an original
composition to be eligible for protection.95 Since each reporter was
crucially responsible for producing the book, this was sufficient for a
claim of authorship.96 The judges placed great reliance on the fact that
absent the “brain and handiwork [of the reporters] the book would
never have had existence.”97 The book’s reliance merely on prior content
(the speech) did not render it any less an act of authorship.98
Walter v. Lane is in important ways consistent with the general
approach to authorship seen in the other early cases. All of these
nineteenth-century cases involved selecting one among several contrib-
utors to the work of expression as its sole—rather than joint—author,
and in each instance the court chose to do so by focusing on a
conception of authorship that examined the ultimate responsibility for
the work’s existence, in a but-for sense of the term.99 But for the speculat-
ing conceiver, who was willing to generate the idea, design, and resources
necessary to produce the work, there would be no work to speak of;100
and but for the reporter transcribing the orally delivered speech, there
would be no record of it to distribute.101 The denial of authorship status
to an employer who played no active (and direct) role whatsoever in the
production of the work was merely a recognition of an outer boundary in
this but-for reasoning—that is, a situation in which the work could have
still been produced even without the employer. The logic of causation
had begun to take shape within copyright’s conception of authorship.
92. Id. at 556.
93. Id. at 542.
94. See id. at 550.
95. See id. at 547–48.
96. Id. at 550.
97. Id. at 559.
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Scott v. Stanford (1867) 3 LR Eq. 718 (Ch) at 723 (Eng.); Hatton v.
Kean (1859) 141 Eng. Rep. 819, 824; 7 C.B.N.S. 268, 279–80; Sweet v. Benning (1855) 139
Eng. Rep. 838, 847–48; 16 C.B. 459, 480–84.
100. See Hatton 141 Eng. Rep. at 823–24; 7 C.B.N.S. at 276–77.
101. See Walter [1900] AC at 550.
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American copyright law around the time appears to have adopted a
largely similar position, though case law directly addressing the question
of authorial causation is more limited. The leading copyright treatise of
the time readily endorses the early English position as good law in the
United States.102 It also gleans from these cases an additional proposition
of causal significance in an effort to reconcile the early cases: “When the
same work is the basis of two or more different copyrights, he is the
author, within the meaning of the statute, who has produced that for
which the copyright is granted.”103 The treatise goes on to observe that a
translator is the author of the translation, even if not of the original
work, and the person who arranges music becomes the author of the
arrangement, even if not of the composition itself.104 This approach to
determining authorship is consistent with Walter v. Lane, but it also
situates the authorship question in the context of the particular act (e.g.,
translation or composition) that the copyright system is attempting to
validate through its grant of exclusive rights. The author, in other words,
is the person who originated the legally defined object of protection
rather than the work as a whole (e.g., the translation rather than the
original book or the arrangement rather than the original score). By
recognizing an identifiable basis for the connection (between author and
work), this construction throws the causal question into sharp relief.
2. Mechanical Intervention in the Creative Process. — It was not until
courts were forced to deal with situations in which creators had relied
extensively on mechanical methods and processes to create the work that
the causal question emerged as an overt consideration in copyright
jurisprudence. Somewhat interestingly, the primary area in which this
arose was in relation to photographs and their copyrightability. Photog-
raphy was invented in the first half of the nineteenth century and started
gaining popularity as an artistic practice a decade or so after.105 As noted
previously, this was also around the time that copyright law—on both
sides of the Atlantic—was grappling with the general question of author-
ship in situations involving multiple contributors.106
In the United States, Congress amended the copyright statute to
include photographs as copyrightable subject matter in 1865.107 Conse-
quently, courts had to decide whether photographs created prior to the
amendment were at all eligible for protection under the general
102. See Drone, supra note 79, at 236.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright’s Response to the
Invention of Photography, 65 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 385, 395–96, 413 (2004) (describing the
popularity of portrait studios within “just ten years of the invention of photography”).
106. See supra section I.A.1 (discussing several English cases involving multiple
contributors and a leading American treatise’s view of these cases).
107. Copyright Act of 1865, ch. 126, § 1, 13 Stat. 540, 540 (repealed 1870).
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principles of copyright. This in turn forced them to grapple with the
process through which photographs were created and the role of human
agency therein. In an 1866 decision, Wood v. Abbott, a New York circuit
court refused to treat a photograph as a work of authorship, reasoning
that in photography, “the only force that contributes to the formation of
the image is the chemical force of light, operating on a surface made
sensitive to its power.”108
The Wood court appeared conflicted about the proper role of
human agency in the creation and production of photographic prints.
For methods of imitation known at the time—such as engraving—the
court readily recognized that the production of the work involved a
“combination” of agency and mechanical processes but acknowledged
that this combination satisfied copyright law’s minimum threshold of
agency to qualify for protection.109 For photography, however, the court
found that this threshold was not satisfied, instead attributing the pro-
duction of the photograph in its entirety to “the chemical force of
light.”110 The human agency, if any, was in turn seen as limited to the
positioning of the plate, paper, frame, and springs—cumulatively beyond
the pale of the authorial causation supposedly recognized by the law at
the time (i.e., pre-1865).111 The reasoning in the case is perfectly con-
sistent with what Professor Christine Farley describes as the conflict
between photography as an art and as a science, which characterizes how
individuals thought about the process at the time.112
After the copyright statute was amended (in both England and the
United States) to cover photographs as protectable subject matter, the
question of determining who might be characterized as the author of a
photograph—and under what conditions—remained significant and fell
to courts. Nottage v. Jackson, decided by the Court of Appeals in
England,113 appears to be among the first cases to consider the question
directly. There, the plaintiffs were the owners of a photography firm with
several employees.114 On one occasion, the manager of the firm—of his
own volition—decided to take a photograph of the Australian cricket
team and sent an assistant to physically “take” the photograph, after
which the firm processed, mounted, and offered the photograph for
sale.115 The question before the court was whether the plaintiffs, who had
no role in the taking of the photograph, could qualify as its author under




112. See Farley, supra note 105, at 389–90.
113. (1883) 11 QBD 627 (Eng.).
114. Id. at 627.
115. Id. at 627–28.
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copyright law.116 The court answered the question in the negative.117
Central to its reasoning was the fact that the plaintiffs had not been
physically present during the taking of the photograph, nor had they
played a supervisory role in its production or in the idea behind it.118
Further complicating the analysis for the court was the reality that, given
the complexity of the equipment involved, the process of taking the
photograph itself often involved more than one individual.119 Reasoning
through these issues, the court noted that it was ultimately searching for
the cause of the photograph:
[A]ll I can do is to see who is the nearest person—the nearest
like the author of a painting or the author of a drawing.
Certainly it is not the man who simply gives the idea of a
picture . . . . He may have the idea, but still he is not there . . . .
The nearest I can come to is that it is the person who effectively
is, as near as he can be, the cause of the picture which is
produced—that is, the person who has superintended the
arrangement, who has actually formed the picture by putting
the people into position, and arranging the place in which the
people are to be—the man who is the effective cause of that.
Although he may only have done it by standing in the room and
giving orders about it, still it is his mind and act, as far as
anybody’s mind and act are concerned, which is the effective
cause of the picture such as it is when it is produced. Therefore
it will be a question in every case who that man is. That will be a
matter of evidence. That will be a question of fact.120
Here one sees for the first time a court openly acknowledging that
the identification of authorship for a work is ultimately a causal
question—a question of determining the “effective cause” of the
protected work.121 Notably, the court readily acknowledged that this
cause will vary from one setting to another, even for the same category of
work.122 It might thus be someone’s superintendence over the process in
one instance, the arrangement of the subjects in another, or the physical
taking of the picture in yet others.123 Additionally, the court gave the
“cause” an epistemic basis—as something that might be discerned from
evidence presented to the court.124
116. Id. at 630.
117. Id. at 633.
118. Id. at 632–33.
119. Id. at 632 (“But he does not do it all, because I suppose there is another man who
gets the plate ready; and there is another man who, when the thing is ready, takes the cap
off.”).
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. Id.
122. See id. (“[I]t will be a question in every case who that man is.”).
123. See id.
124. See id. (noting the identity of the person who is the work’s “effective cause” is “a
matter of evidence” and “a matter of fact”).
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In short order, the same question arose under U.S. copyright law in
the landmark Supreme Court case of Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony.125 Burrow-Giles involved a photograph of Oscar Wilde, taken by the
photographer Napoleon Sarony.126 Sarony had posed Wilde in a particu-
lar way, played a role in Wilde’s choice of attire, and then directed the
taking of the photograph.127 Yet the defendant argued that the photo-
graph could not be protected as a matter of copyright and constitutional
law, since there was no identifiable author and its production was
“merely mechanical,” involving “the manual operation, by the use of
these instruments and preparations, of transferring to the plate the
visible representation of some existing object, the accuracy of this
representation being its highest merit.”128
The Court chose to dodge the question of determining when and
how photography was a purely mechanical (as opposed to artistic)
process by concluding that an “ordinary production of a photograph”
was indeed a purely mechanical process that would not qualify for
protection.129 Sarony’s photograph, however, was not such an ordinary
production; instead, it was “an original work of art[] [and] the product
of plaintiff’s intellectual invention,” which rendered it eligible for
protection.130 The Court then approvingly cited the English decision in
Nottage—specifically the language about the author being the effective
cause of the work—and noted that the author of a photograph was “the
man who really represents, creates, or gives effect to the idea, fancy, or
imagination.”131 With this, Burrow-Giles came to endorse the “effective
cause”–based construction of authorship in photographs.132
As Farley notes, the Court’s focus on the cause of the photograph
arose as a result of its attempt to locate authorship in the preshutter
activities of the photographer rather than in the postshutter—that is,
negative development—ones.133 This allowed the conception of author-
ship to draw a bright line between the human and mechanical aspects of
photography, since postshutter activities at the time involved a far more
significant reliance on technology.134 In other words, the Court’s singular
focus on the preshutter cause of the photograph allowed authorship to
emphasize the human dimension of the creative process involved.
125. 111 U.S. 53 (1884). Burrow-Giles now forms part of the copyright law canon. See,
e.g., Farley, supra note 105, at 386 (describing it as a “well-known case in copyright law”).
126. See Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 54–55.
127. Id. at 55.
128. Id. at 59.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 60.
131. Id. at 60–61.
132. See id.
133. Farley, supra note 105, at 390.
134. See id.
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Later photography cases generally followed the framework of Burrow-
Giles, looking for sufficient preshutter agency on the part of a plaintiff-
claimant to find authorship.135 The “effective cause” idea has in the years
since Burrow-Giles become the dominant approach to determining the
authorship of a photograph, albeit without open acknowledgement.136 It
is precisely because of the open-ended epistemic nature of this standard
that courts have on multiple occasions been able to locate the authorship
of photographs in individuals other than the photographer who presses
the shutter button.137 Others involved in arranging, posing, or curating
the subject matter have, through an application of the effective-cause
standard, come to be seen as equally important agents in the overall
causal chain that results in the production of the photograph.138
Burrow-Giles’s effective-cause framework has had influence beyond
photographs as well. For example, one court used the framework to
classify the director of a motion picture as the work’s author, even though
he played no direct role in its underwater filming, owing to the “control”
that the director exercised over the overall process.139
On one occasion, the Third Circuit used this idea to underplay the
mechanical aspects of fixation in the authorship determination. In
Andrien v. Southern Ocean County Chamber of Commerce, the court treated a
cartographer who had surveyed a geographic area, conceptualized the
maps at issue, and directed their production as the author of the maps
135. See, e.g., Brod v. Gen. Publ’g Grp., 32 F. App’x 231, 234 (9th Cir. 2002) (relying
on Burrow-Giles to find a copyrightable contribution for a joint-authorship claim in a
photograph); Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“Courts today continue to hold that such decisions by the photographer [as described in
Burrow-Giles]—or, more precisely, the elements of photographs that result from these
decisions—are worthy of copyright protection.”); Farley, supra note 105, at 438–46
(discussing several post-Burrow-Giles photography cases and noting the similar emphasis on
the photographer’s “process”).
136. This dominance is implicit in the reality that copyright law today embeds
authorship in the question of originality and then assesses such originality for photographs
using “the process that produced the work.” See Justin Hughes, The Photographer’s
Copyright—Photograph as Art, Photograph as Database, 25 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 339, 396–97
(2012).
137. See, e.g., Brod, 32 F. App’x at 235 (finding the photographer to be a coauthor
with an individual who played a role in arranging the subject matter); Robinson v. Buy-Rite
Costume Jewelry, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 3619(DC), 2004 WL 1878781, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23,
2004) (allowing individuals who did not physically take a photograph to be coauthors of
the work). But see SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 316
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (denying the nonphotographing party the status of joint author).
138. See, e.g., Brod, 32 F. App’x at 231 (finding that a book author who hired a
photographer to take photographs for the book was a joint author of the photographs);
Robinson, 2004 WL 1878781, at *3–4 (finding the hiring party to be a joint author of the
photograph).
139. Lindsay v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic, No. 97 Civ. 9248(HB),
1999 WL 816163, at *4–6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1999).
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even though someone else had actually printed them.140 The court
defined the author as “the party who actually creates the work, that is,
the person who translates an idea into an expression that is embodied in
a copy by himself or herself, or who authorizes another to embody the
expression in a copy.”141 When the final task of fixation and embodiment
might be characterized as purely “rote” or “mechanical,” the court
reasoned that the human agency that constitutes authorship—that is, the
cause—is to be found earlier in the chain.142 Distilled down to its basics,
this logic is but a reaffirmation of the standard developed in Burrow-Giles.
The mechanical-intervention cases thus brought the causal dimen-
sion of authorship to the forefront in copyright jurisprudence. While
early cases—culminating in Burrow-Giles—articulated the idea in
avowedly causal terms,143 later jurisprudence used terminology that
seemed less overtly causal but nonetheless focused on the nature and
quantum of human agency involved in bringing the work into exist-
ence.144 More recently, the question has arisen in cases relating to so-
called “computational creativity”—situations in which a person creates a
computer program that then itself generates creative expression using its
artificial intelligence.145 In these instances, scholars have begun to
question the appropriate role of human agency in determining the
authorship of what are essentially machine-produced works.146
3. Spiritual Authorship. — A third area in which the questions of
human agency and causation became central to determining authorship
for copyright purposes is automatic writing, also referred to as “psy-
chography.”147 Psychography involves an individual who transcribes
expression that was supposedly communicated to her by a supernatural
140. See 927 F.2d 132, 133 (3d Cir. 1991).
141. Id. at 134.
142. Id. at 135.
143. See supra notes 113–120 and accompanying text (describing the courts’ search
for the “effective cause” in preshutter agency).
144. See supra notes 135–142 and accompanying text (discussing the focus on human
agency in photography, film, and cartography cases).
145. See Bridy, supra note 56, at 9–18 (discussing theories of computational creativity
and describing several existing automatic-generating programs).
146. See id. at 21 (“Human creativity is necessary for the production of the
[procedurally generated] work, but the human creative agent is not the author of the work
in the traditional sense.”); see also Grimmelmann, Copyright for Literate Robots, supra
note 56, at 669–74 (discussing various issues related to the authorship of computer-
generated works); Grimmelmann, No Such Thing, supra note 56, at 409–14 (discussing
the potential allocation of ownership between programmers and users of computer-
generated works).
147. See William Stainton Moses, Psychography: A Treatise on One of the Objective
Forms of Psychic or Spiritual Phenomena 19 (London, W.H. Harrison 1878); J.J. Owen,
Psychography: Marvelous Manifestations of Psychic Power 14 (S.F., The Hicks Judd Co.
1893).
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source.148 The individual operates as the medium and converts the
message of the supernatural source into understandable expression.149
The early-twentieth-century English case of Cummins v. Bond150 was the
first to decide who the author of such expression was for the purposes of
copyright law.151
The plaintiff in Cummins was a psychic who practiced automatic
writing.152 After covering her eyes with one hand and holding a pencil in
the other, she would pass into a state of trance and begin writing rapidly
on a sheet of paper, sometimes at the rate of 2,000 words per hour and a
half.153 On one such occasion, she claimed to have been visited by a spirit
and came to produce a work titled The Chronicle of Cleophas.154 The work
was authored in an archaic language, which the defendant then
copied.155 In an action for copyright infringement, the court had to
confront the question of authorship in the work.156
The court—somewhat comically—noted that the “true originator of
all that is to be found in these documents is some being no longer
inhabiting this world, and who has been out of it for a length of time
sufficient to justify the hope that he has no reason for wishing to return
to it.”157 Without disputing the veracity of this claim, the court nonethe-
less proceeded to find that the plaintiff was indeed the author of the
work for copyright purposes:
[T]he communications . . . could not have reached us in this
form without the active co-operation of some agent competent
to translate them from the language in which they were
communicated to her into something more intelligible to
persons of the present day. The plaintiff claims to be this agent
and to possess, and the defendant admits that she does possess,
some qualification enabling her, when in a more or less uncon-
scious condition, to reproduce in language understandable by
those who have the time and inclination to read it, information
supplied to her from the source referred to in language with
which the plaintiff has no acquaintance when fully awake.
148. See Moses, supra note 147, at 19 (defining psychography as “writing without the
intervention of ordinary human agency”); Owen, supra note 147, at 14 (describing
psychography as “writing by spirit power”).
149. See Blewett Lee, Copyright of Automatic Writing, 13 Va. L. Rev. 22, 23–24 (1926);
see also Owen, supra note 147, at 16–17 (discussing how a “message would appear” after
communication to a “spirit”).
150. (1927) 1 Ch 167.
151. See Lee, supra note 149, at 23 (noting Cummins was “apparently . . . the earliest
appearance in court of those curious writings”).
152. Cummins 1 Ch at 168.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 173.
156. See id. at 172–75.
157. Id. at 172.
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. . . [I]t would seem to be clear that the authorship rests
with this lady, to whose gift of extremely rapid writing coupled
with a peculiar ability to reproduce in archaic English matter
communicated to her in some unknown tongue we owe the
production of these documents.158
In short, the court needed to identify a human agent responsible for the
production of the particular expression for which protection was being
sought under copyright.159
Cummins thus articulates the logic first put forth in Walter v. Lane,
namely that the author is the individual but for whose actions the work—
in its protectable form—would not be in existence at all.160 Yet there is
also a so-far unacknowledged element: the need to identify a human
cause for the work.161 The precise rationale for this human element
remains somewhat unclear. Perhaps it had its origins in the court’s
inability to countenance the possibility that the work at issue might be
rendered authorless altogether if a human source for the creativity were
not identified.
As recently as 2000, the logic of Cummins in identifying the first
human actor who transcribes a psychographic work as its author
appeared to hold sway. In Penguin Books U.S.A., Inc. v. New Christian
Church of Full Endeavor, Ltd.,162 the court was presented with facts very
similar to those of Cummins. A psychic had experienced a series of
dreams and heard an inner voice, which requested her to transcribe its
message into writing.163 She then engaged in “rapid inner dictation,”
which produced an elaborate set of notes that she then edited and
converted into a published manuscript.164 During the litigation, the court
had to address the question of authorship over the manuscript.165 Relying
on Cummins, it concluded that the psychic was indeed the author, since
“dictation from a nonhuman source should not be a bar to copyright.”166
As in Cummins, the court relied on but-for causal logic:
158. Id. at 173.
159. See id.
160. Compare id. (reasoning “authorship rests with” the plaintiff because “we owe the
production of these documents” to her abilities), with Walter v. Lane [1900] AC 539 (HL)
at 559 (appeal taken from Eng.) (arguing authorship vested in the plaintiffs because
“without [the reporter’s] brain and handiwork the [work] would never have had
existence”).
161. See Cummins 1 Ch at 172–73 (emphasizing the importance of the role of the
human “agent” in producing the work).
162. No. 96 CIV. 4126(RWS), 2000 WL 1028634 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2000) (granting
preliminary injunction), vacated, No. 96 Civ. 4126(RWS), 2004 WL 906301 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
27, 2004).
163. Id. at *2.
164. Id.
165. See id. at *9–14.
166. Id. at *12.
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[I]f indeed it was Jesus who spoke to [the psychic], it was only
because she had opened herself up to the possibility of
receiving this vision . . . . Again, even if the [work] came from
Jesus, significant aspects of it are the direct result of it having
come through [the psychic]. In this way, [the psychic] is . . . an
author . . . , since even Defendants in this action have essentially
conceded that had the [work] been channeled through any
other individual, its form would have been different.167
Similar to Cummins, the need to identify a human cause for the human-
processed expression was at the root of the Penguin Books court’s reasoning.
It is, of course, quite plausible that the courts in these cases were
implicitly questioning the veracity of the plaintiff’s factual claims (i.e.,
about the true source) and merely articulating a rationale to mask their
disbelief. In other words, one might see these courts’ reasoning as a form
of ex post rationalization, rather than an analytical precursor to their
conclusion.168 Even allowing for that possibility, the courts’ decision to
connect authorship with human agency is revealing: The effort to
distinguish between human and nonhuman agency—whether real or
motivated—lends support to the proposition that the courts’ conception
of authorship was motivated in no small part by what is effectively a causal
question (i.e., agency).
The copyright jurisprudence on spiritual authorship introduces a
new element into the causation inquiry. On the one hand, it builds on
the preexisting case law that looks to the effective cause of the work in a
but-for sense.169 Yet it does so by expressly acknowledging that the effec-
tive cause needs to be human,170 a supposition that the mechanical-
intervention cases alluded to but never openly endorsed.171 As previously
noted, in the context of mechanical intervention, some courts appeared
perfectly willing to deny a work any copyright protection on the basis that
it did not involve sufficient authorial creativity.172 The merger of the
concepts of copyrightability, authorship, and originality thereby came to
167. Id. at *10.
168. See Felix S. Cohen, Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals 237–38 (1959) (discussing
the idea of rationalization as a form of artificially providing ex post reasons “wherever
specified results are dictated by undisclosed determinants”); Jerome Frank, Law and the
Modern Mind 130 (1935) (“[O]ne of [the] chief uses [of legal rules and principles] is to
enable the judges to give formal justifications . . . of the conclusions at which they other-
wise arrive.”).
169. See supra section I.A.2 (discussing the effective-cause framework in mechanical-
intervention cases); supra notes 158–167 and accompanying text (highlighting the role of
but-for causation in spiritual-authorship cases).
170. See supra notes 161, 166–167 and accompanying text (underscoring the court’s
search for a “human” cause in Cummins).
171. See supra section I.A.2 (highlighting several courts’ discussions about whether
the photographs at issue had mechanical or human causes).
172. See supra notes 108–112 and accompanying text (discussing the Wood v. Abbott
court’s doubt as to the human agency involved in photography).
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mask the emphasis on humans. With spiritual intervention, the work
itself could rarely be classified as uncopyrightable on its face given its
prima facie originality (unlike a photograph that could, by contrast, be
treated as an “ordinary production”), necessitating an account for
preferring the human to the nonhuman actor, even when the human
actor openly acknowledged the centrality of the nonhuman element to
the creative process. And courts came to develop that account around
the idea that the work could not have been brought into “earth[l]y”
existence without the psychic’s (i.e., the human’s) role and intervention,
short for the logic of but-for causation.173
B. The Search for Human Agency
As the previous discussions reveal, causation has historically factored
into copyright law’s conception of authorship.174 Courts paid close
attention to the form, quality, and quantity of agency involved in the
production of the creative work when determining whether a claimant
qualifies as an author.175 An identification of the right kind of human
agency—that caused the work to be brought into existence—was thus
integral to the construction of authorship.
It is important to appreciate a crucial baseline that played an
implicit role in copyright’s early account of causation. In searching for
the agency at the root of a work, early copyright jurisprudence focused
entirely on the human agency that might be properly characterized as
causally responsible for the work.176 Authorship was therefore presump-
tively a human endeavor, as far as copyright law was concerned. The logic
underlying this proposition was somewhat obvious. Given that authorship
was invariably tied to ownership and the assertion of legal rights, it made
little sense to speak of nonhuman authorship. In addition, given the
fundamentally instrumental nature of Anglo-American copyright law
(“for encouragement of learning”177), relating it to human intervention
seemed but essential.
All the same, this seemingly unobjectionable precept had a less-than-
subtle effect on the analysis. Once a person brought a facially original
work of expression into existence, the parameters of the search for
173. E.g., Cummins v. Bond (1927) 1 Ch 167 at 175 (Eng.); see also Leah v. Two
Worlds Publ’g Co. (1951) 1 Ch 393 at 398 (Eng.) (applying Cummins’s logic to an artist’s
production of a portrait through spiritual intervention).
174. See supra section I.A.
175. See supra section I.A.
176. See supra sections I.A.2–.3 (discussing courts’ efforts to separate human creativity
from mechanical processes and to find human agency in cases involving “automatic
writing”).
177. Copyright Act 1709 (Statute of Anne), 8 Ann. c. 21 (Gr. Brit.) (repealed 1842);
see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (providing the basis for copyright protection under
U.S. law).
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agency automatically became narrower. When there were competing
claimants for authorship status, courts merely had to examine whose
particular agency was more directly connected to the existence of the
work—rather than whether any of their agencies was objectively sufficient
on its own.178 In other words, the possibility that none of the claimants
might satisfy an absolute threshold of agency for the claim to authorship
never emerged in these situations because the original work would
thereby be rendered unprotected altogether—a result that the work’s
facially original or creative nature intuitively militated against.
The same pattern appears in cases involving nonhuman (i.e.,
mechanical or spiritual) intervention. When some early courts concluded
that photographs were more the product of mechanical processes than
human creativity and denied plaintiffs’ authorship claims, this had the
effect of denying the work any protection under copyright law.179
However, these courts’ willingness to come to this conclusion was closely
tied to findings—seen in these opinions—about the photographs
themselves (whether individually or as a class), especially insofar as such
photography sought to replicate reality.180 This lies in contrast to
situations in which the work itself was prima facie creative, such as with
spiritual authorship. In these situations, courts readily disregarded the
nonhuman element in the creative process in order to credit the human
actor as the author of the work based on a minimal level of agency, often
with the explicit recognition that to do otherwise would be to exclude a
facially original creation from the realm of copyright altogether.181
One might thus appropriately describe the search for human agency
in copyright law as a constrained analysis. When a work is indisputably
protectable and the question is merely who—among multiple contend-
ers—is to qualify as its author, the inquiry focuses on the precise form
178. See, e.g., Walter v. Lane [1900] AC 539 (HL) at 559 (appeal taken from Eng.)
(deciding whether the reporters or the public personality were the authors of the
transcribed speech); Shepherd v. Conquest (1856) 139 Eng. Rep. 1140 (CP) 1147; 17 C.B.
427 (deciding whether the proprietors or the playwright qualified as the author of the
work).
179. See, e.g., Wood v. Abbott, 30 F. Cas. 424, 425 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1866) (No. 17,938)
(concluding that while photography may be an “original and independent method of
producing” pictures, photographs were outside the domain of what “the law was intended
to protect”); supra notes 108–111 and accompanying text (discussing Wood).
180. See, e.g., Wood, 30 F. Cas. at 425 (reasoning photography was not protectable
because it did not involve “printing in any sense known to the arts at the time” of the
copyright statute’s passage).
181. See, e.g., Cummins v. Bond (1927) 1 Ch 167 at 175 (Eng.) (“[T]he conclusion
which the defendant invites me to come to in this submission involves the expression of an
opinion I am not prepared to make, that the authorship and copyright rest with some one
already domiciled on the other side of the inevitable river.”).
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and quantum of human agency involved.182 One might term this the
“relative agency determination,” since the court is merely comparing
multiple human agencies to select one as authorial. When courts view a
work as meriting protection but view such protection as contingent on
identifying an author without which the work would fall into the public
domain, the inquiry instead focuses on locating and identifying the
minimum agency required for authorship.183 This variant is best described
as the “absolute agency determination,” since the court is attempting to
construct an account of authorial agency to establish copyright protection.
Both variants are undoubtedly questions of causation, but each is
influenced by the precise framing and context of what the causal inquiry
is seeking to achieve: protection or allocation.
Recognizing the constrained nature of the search for human agency
in the authorship analysis also produces another, perhaps more im-
portant, insight about the causal inquiry in copyright law: namely, that it
embodies two analytically distinct (albeit functionally overlapping)
elements. The first element is principally factual, with the law examining
whether and how an individual put into motion the set of acts that
eventually resulted in the production of the work under scrutiny. This
constitutes the epistemic dimension of the causal inquiry in the authorship
determination, since it focuses on the sufficiency and significance of the
evidence available to determine that an individual did actually produce
the work in a purely metaphysical sense.
Courts acknowledge this aspect of the inquiry when they concede
that determining the cause of a work is principally a “matter of
evidence,” as occurred in Nottage.184 The primary mechanism that they
thus employ in this epistemic endeavor is the but-for causation test or the
sine qua non approach, which is well known in other contexts.185 This
test essentially involves determining whether—as a counterfactual—the
outcome that did occur (i.e., the creation of the work) would have
occurred even without the intervention of the actor in question, which
helps the court to ascertain the causal nexus in question. Thus the
Nottage court was essentially concluding that the photograph would have
very well come into existence even without the role of the plaintiff-
182. See supra section I.A.1 (highlighting courts’ emphasis on the purported authors’
types and amounts of contributions when multiple parties contributed to the creation of
the work).
183. See supra section I.A.2 (describing courts’ focus in mechanical-intervention cases
on determining whether the purported author had exercised a minimum amount of
human agency).
184. See Nottage v. Jackson (1883) 11 QBD 627 at 632 (Eng.).
185. One can see the idea commonly deployed in tort law and criminal law. See, e.g.,
Michael S. Moore, Placing Blame: A Theory of Criminal Law 52 (1997) (describing the
“familiar sine qua non test” as the “dominant theory of cause in fact”); Calabresi, supra
note 36, at 72 (describing the sine qua non approach as a “familiar one” and as “common
enough” to need “no special discussion”).
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proprietors, thereby rendering their intervention causally unrelated to
the final work.
All the same, it is critical to appreciate that the epistemic dimension
does not exhaust the entire gamut of the causal inquiry. Rather, the
causal inquiry also embodies an evaluative dimension. This evaluative
dimension transcends the more probative dimension—though it still
depends on the probative dimension—and examines whether, even if a
purely factual basis for a causal attribution exists, this factual basis ought
to be sufficient for such an attribution. The evaluative aspect, in other
words, asks whether the epistemically defensible cause ought to be
enough for authorship purposes given the obvious consequences of an
affirmative finding. Instead of relying entirely on the conceptual or
analytical for an answer, the evaluative dimension looks to the
implications of the determination and approaches the causal analysis
pragmatically.
A good example of this evaluative dimension at work is the court’s
conclusion in Shepherd that the mere existence of an employment
relationship ought not, on its own, produce the status of authorship.186 In
essence, the Shepherd court was suggesting that even if an employer might
have played a role in initiating the production of the work, that connec-
tion was insufficient in the case at hand—for authorship purposes—to
qualify as the normatively relevant cause of the work.187 Even if the court
was not explicit about it, the fact that one individual’s creative labor
might produce ownership rights (and exclusivity) in another person who
merely suggested the idea and did no more seemed unfair and did not
align with copyright’s fundamental purpose of “elevat[ing] and
protect[ing] literary men.”188 The consequence—“buy[ing] [the author’s]
brains”—was thus integral to the court’s evaluation of causal
sufficiency.189
Much of copyright’s account of authorial causation is evaluative in
nature and content. Even when the evidence shows an individual to have
contributed in some minimal way to the creation of the work—either
absolutely or relatively—courts still analyze whether that contribution
should be the basis for authorship.190 And in making this determination,
186. See Shepherd v. Conquest (1856) 139 Eng. Rep. 1140 (CP) 1147–48; 17 C.B. 427,
443–45.
187. See id. at 1147; 17 C.B. at 445 (“It appears to us an abuse of terms to say . . . the
employer is the author of a work to which his mind has not contributed an idea . . . .”).
188. See id. at 1147; 17 C.B. at 444.
189. See id. at 1147; 17 C.B. at 443–44 (internal quotation marks omitted).
190. See Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 303 (7th Cir. 2011) (denying
authorship even though the plaintiff had contributed significantly in the design and
production of the garden); Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2005)
(denying protection to a person’s likeness, which obviously derives from a person);
Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 2000) (denying authorship status to a
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they implicitly turn to normative considerations underlying the institu-
tion, often without overt acknowledgment.191 Examining the multiple
considerations that courts (implicitly and explicitly) take into account in
the evaluative part of the causal inquiry reveals three general principles
that motivate courts’ analysis, each of which operates as a midlevel
constraint rather than as a foundational principle.192 Despite being
analytically distinct, these principles are not always mutually exclusive.
Section III.C elucidates on these principles,193 but they first deserve
mention here.
The first principle is the adequacy of control over the creative
process.194 In situations in which the putative author has had insufficient
creative control over the process through which the work was created,
either absolutely or relatively, courts treat the causal nexus as insufficient
to generate authorship.195 One can see this principle at work in a recent
case, Kelley v. Chicago Park District, in which the court denied protection
to an artist who had created an aesthetically pleasing arrangement of live
plants in a garden and sought to copyright the product as a form of
conceptual art.196 The court instead concluded that “gardens are planted
and cultivated, not authored,” since they emerge from nature rather
than human creation.197
The second principle is that of disproportionality.198 When a court
determines that according authorial status to one party is likely to
produce an unfair distribution of the entitlement, either by reference to
the parties’ respective labor, intellectual input, or investment, once again
the court may deem the causal chain severed.199 In the early copyright
historical consultant in a movie during a joint-authorship dispute); Shepherd 139 Eng. Rep.
at 1148; 17 C.B. at 445 (finding that an employer’s mere suggestion that an employee
create a work does not establish the employer’s authorship).
191. See Kelley, 635 F.3d at 303 (concluding gardens should not be the subject of
authorship but equivocating on the reasons for this conclusion); Toney, 406 F.3d at 910
(concluding a person’s likeness is not authored but offering no reasons for this
conclusion).
192. For a critical account of midlevel principles within intellectual property, see David
H. Blankfein-Tabachnick, Intellectual Property Doctrine and Midlevel Principles, 101
Calif. L. Rev. 1315 (2013). The discussion returns to the distinction between midlevel and
foundational principles in Part III.
193. Infra section III.C.
194. Infra section III.C.1.
195. Infra section III.C.1.
196. See 635 F.3d at 292–95, 304–06.
197. Id. at 304.
198. Infra section III.C.2.
199. Infra section III.C.2.
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cases, courts invoked this principle in situations that involved multiple
contributors.200
The third principle emerges from a desire to avoid a personality
conflation in identifying the author.201 Authorship entails instantiating
one’s personal choices into the expressive content of a work.202 Courts
strive to ensure that the process of delineating the author by reference to
causation tracks the creative process.203 When finding a causal nexus
would conflate the salience of these choices, they readily find it to be
severed.204 One sees this logic at play in the law’s efforts to demarcate the
boundaries of different works based on different authors’ contributions,
especially when those works themselves appear interrelated.205 It is
precisely this idea that Eaton Drone captured with his observation that
when content can give rise to different works, the author is the person
“who has produced that for which the copyright is granted.”206 According
to this conception of causation, a lawful translation is not legally caused
by the author of the original work that was the subject of the translation.207
Each of these principles tracks important normative considerations
and precepts underlying the copyright system, many of which remain
relevant today. Putting the relative–absolute and epistemic–evaluative
elements of the causal inquiry together thus yields four variants of the
causal question in the authorship determination. All four variants of the
causal inquiry can be found in copyright jurisprudence, even though
courts rarely acknowledge the precise analytical nature of the investiga-
tion that they are undertaking. In particular, courts hesitate to admit to
the evaluative nature of the inquiry in certain situations, especially in the
absolute setting. They instead mask the causal framework behind
copyright’s other entry requirements, such as originality.208
200. See supra section I.A.1 (describing courts’ denial of “author” status to claimants
who had contributed relatively little to the works at issue).
201. Infra section III.C.3.
202. Infra section III.C.3.
203. Infra section III.C.3.
204. Infra section III.C.3.
205. Infra section III.C.3.
206. Drone, supra note 79, at 236.
207. Infra section III.C.3.
208. See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59–60 (1884)
(conflating authorship and originality).
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TABLE 1: THEDIMENSIONS OF AUTHORIAL CAUSATION
It is especially important to appreciate the epistemic–evaluative
distinction. While courts readily acknowledge the epistemic part of the
question in their reasoning, they are far less willing to admit the exist-
ence of the evaluative, instead preferring to couch the evaluative aspects
of the inquiry in probative terms as well.209 Of course, this phenomenon
is hardly unique to copyright law.210 Yet when coupled with courts’
frequent unwillingness to acknowledge the existence of a causal dimen-
sion in their copyrightability determinations, the collapse of the evalua-
tive aspects of the inquiry into the epistemic confounds the analysis even
further.
Authorship has therefore long embodied a theory of causation,
reflected in the institution’s search for human agency as the source of
209. See, e.g., Nottage v. Jackson (1883) 11 QBD 627 at 632 (Eng.) (noting the
“effective cause” question is a “question of fact”).
210. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Constraint of Legal Doctrine, 163 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1843, 1847–50 (2015) (describing three ways in which legal doctrine can “constrain”
judicial decisionmaking and contending that judges’ publicly offered justifications can
sometimes “mask[] the true grounds of decision”); Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal
Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 267, 275–76 (1997) (noting
judges’ tendency to decide cases on the basis of the facts and use applicable law primarily
as an ex post justification); Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 Tex. L. Rev.
749, 753–54 (2013) (describing legal realism’s denial of the traditional view that “legal










Treating the first person to
physically fix a work and











Treating the first human
transcriber of a spiritual
work as its author.
(Cummins v. Bond)
Finding a gardener’s
arrangement of live plants
in an aesthetically pleasing
manner insufficient to
merit authorship.
(Kelley v. Chicago Park
District)
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protectable expression. A notable feature of this causal theory is that it
embodies important normative elements, requiring courts to exercise
their judgment over the form and sufficiency of the agency at issue in
each instance. Motivated by copyright’s emphasis on human creativity as
a foundational ideal and informed by the institution’s additional commit-
ments, copyright’s search for causation in determining authorship is
functionally embedded in the institution’s overall framework of copy-
rightability. All the same, it remains analytically and conceptually
distinct—a reality that is often forgotten when it is hidden behind
copyright’s other doctrinal devices.
II. MODERN PROXIES FOR CAUSATION
Part I introduced the theory of authorial causation underlying
copyright law, principally in situations in which the nature and identity of
authorship required a clear determination. This Part moves to the
modern context, in which courts have made the causal determination
within several of copyright’s doctrinal mechanisms, each of which exists
for reasons unconnected to causation.
During the formative years of copyright law, courts were willing to
develop copyright doctrine by reasoning from first principles.211 As the
law evolved, copyright jurisprudence developed a finite set of doctrinal
rules and devices that courts could employ.212 In the United States, this
evolution reached its pinnacle with the Copyright Act of 1976,213 which
comprehensively revised the federal copyright law.214 In effect, this
crystallized copyright’s myriad doctrinal mechanisms, even though the
statute itself did not purport to restrict judge-made copyright law.215 The
211. See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903)
(developing the standard for originality); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103–04 (1879)
(deciding that copyright protection does not extend to ideas and methods); Wheaton v.
Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 667–68 (1834) (denying the existence of copyright in court opinions);
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344–45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (developing the
scope of copyright infringement and what would ultimately become the fair use doctrine).
212. For a prescriptive, mid-twentieth-century elaboration of this ideal, see Zechariah
Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 514–15 (1945)
(discussing how copyright’s “legal rules” should be “certain, readily understood, not
unduly complicated, [and] as easy as possible to apply,” which implies a restriction on
their fecundity). Specifically, Professor Zechariah Chafee emphasized that leaving
questions “unsettled” was a problem. Id. at 514.
213. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012)).
214. U.S. Copyright Office, Circular 92, Copyright Law of the United States and
Related Laws Contained in Title 17 of the United States Code, at v (2011), http://www.
copyright.gov/title17/circ92.pdf [http://perma.cc/KK6Q-BTUT].
215. See Pierre N. Leval, An Assembly of Idiots?, 34 Conn. L. Rev. 1049, 1061–62
(2002) (lamenting this move away from judge-made law after the 1976 statute); see also
Balganesh, Debunking Blackstonian Copyright, supra note 51, at 1167–68 (arguing the
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net result was that courts became far less willing to rely on first principles
in their decisions, preferring to rely on copyright’s statutorily validated
mechanisms instead.216
Authorial causation fell victim to this development. The tasks of
independently determining whether something was a “work of author-
ship” and whether an actor was an “author” began to recede in
importance, as more and more of copyright doctrine became codified.
And yet, Congress never once defined “authorship” as part of this
codification; nor did Congress make authorship an independent element
that a claimant needed to prove to obtain protection.217 Consequently,
courts confronting questions of authorship—and authorial causation—
have had to address them through other doctrinal mechanisms.218 This
indirect or proxy method of dealing with authorial causation has pro-
duced the impression that authorial causation is altogether redundant
within modern copyright law’s analytical framework.
The remainder of this Part examines the three most prominent
copyright doctrines in which questions of authorial causation remain
embedded and indirectly addressed, albeit in an ad hoc manner.219
Section II.A discusses the originality doctrine, which at first seems to
embody an overt causal dimension but ultimately does not permit courts
to sufficiently scrutinize the process of authoring and its underlying ideas
about causation. Section II.B examines the joint works doctrine, which
has at times allowed courts to mask their causal intuitions under the
doctrine’s “mutual intent” requirement. Finally, section II.C turns to the
work for hire doctrine, which presumes a causal relationship between two
parties without further inquiry, once certain threshold criteria are met.
A. Originality
Protection under copyright law exists only in “original works of
authorship” when “fixed in [a] tangible medium of expression.”220 The
legislative history accompanying the Copyright Act describes originality
and fixation as the “two fundamental criteria of copyright protection.”221
1976 statute should be understood as a “common law statute” that requires judicial
lawmaking).
216. See Christopher S. Yoo, The Impact of Codification on the Judicial Development
of Copyright, in Intellectual Property and the Common Law 177, 178–86 (Shyamkrishna
Balganesh ed., 2013).
217. See Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 1069–72 (discussing this absence in U.S.
copyright law and comparative copyright law more generally).
218. See infra sections II.A–.C.
219. This is not to suggest that authorial causation does not underlie other areas of
copyright law. Rather, this Part focuses on these particular areas because the causation
question appears in these three domains with a heightened degree of regularity.
220. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
221. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664.
36 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 117:1
Originality represents modern copyright law’s best-known entry
requirement.222
The Copyright Act does not define originality; rather, the concept is
entirely a creation of courts.223 The term’s precise meaning has fluctu-
ated over the course of copyright’s long history, but the modern
understanding—at least in the American context—derives from the
Supreme Court’s well-known decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co.224 In tracing the originality requirement back to the
Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the Court observed that
“[o]riginal, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work
was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from
other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of
creativity.”225 The modern requirement of originality therefore embodies
two distinct components. First, the work must “owe[] its origin” to the
claimant (i.e., the author);226 and second, it must exhibit a “modicum of
creativity,”227 a requirement that is fairly easy to satisfy in practice even
though it appears to connote a higher bar in theory.228
On the face of things, originality thus appears to directly—and
overtly—embody a dimension of authorial causation. Indeed, in the
modern context, some scholars argue that originality is “synonymous
with authorship.”229 The emphasis on the work–author connection
(“owe”) and a creative contribution appear to corroborate that proposi-
tion.230 Yet closer scrutiny of the modern understanding of the require-
ment post-Feist reveals the causal underpinnings of originality to be
largely superficial and perhaps even nonexistent.
While originality does require that the work “owe” its origin to its
author231—suggesting scrutiny of how, when, and where the author
brought the work into existence—in practice, the owing is more of a
222. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“The sine
qua non of copyright is originality.”).
223. Id. (“The phrase . . . is purposely left undefined, [and] intended to incorporate
without change the standard of originality established by the courts under the present
[1909] copyright statute.” (third alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting H.R.
Rep. No. 94-1476, at 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5664)).
224. 499 U.S. 340.
225. Id. at 345.
226. Id. at 346–47 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic
Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884)).
227. Id. at 346.
228. See id. at 345 (“To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a
slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily . . . .”).
229. Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 1078.
230. Cf. Feist, 499 U.S. at 346 (reiterating the requirement that a work “owe[] its
origin” to the purported author (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Burrow-Giles,
111 U.S. at 58)).
231. Id.
2017] CAUSING COPYRIGHT 37
negative requirement. Ultimately, courts have deemed the requirement
satisfied whenever the work is “independently created” by its author,
which amounts to no more than a requirement that the author not have
“copied” the work from any other work or material.232 The owing
requirement is thus a simple noncopying mandate rather than an
affirmative requirement of some active contribution on the part of the
claimant—something that Feist appears to acknowledge.233 Once satisfied
that the author did not copy the work from other works or materials, and
that the author is asserting a claim to the originality manifested in such
work or materials, courts almost never scrutinize the creative process
itself to ask whether and how the author brought the work into existence.
Judge Jerome Frank put this point most starkly when he noted that the
requirement is “little more than a prohibition of actual copying” and
that “[n]o matter how poor the ‘author’s’ addition, it is enough if it be
his own.”234 While Judge Frank did later add that the author had to
“adopt” the work as his own for this purpose (especially when the
originality was “unintentional[]”),235 this adoption requirement suggests
no more than a requirement of affirmative assertion rather than any
scrutiny of its underlying basis or legitimacy.236 The owing element thus
performs a largely negative—or exclusionary—function, of denying a
work protection when shown to have been copied from another.237
Authorial causation is thus readily presumed as long as there is no
copying.
Additionally, Feist explicitly rejected the “sweat of the brow”
interpretation of originality, which would have rewarded industriousness
232. Id. at 345; Novelty Textile Mills v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1093 n.3 (2d
Cir. 1977); 1 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 28, § 2.01[A][1] (“[A] work is original and
may command copyright protection even if it is completely identical with a prior work,
provided it was not copied from such prior work but is instead a product of the
independent efforts of its author.”).
233. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (“Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only
that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other
works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.”).
234. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hoague-Sprague Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer
Co., 31 F.2d 583, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1929)).
235. Id. at 105.
236. Indeed, neither Judge Frank nor later copyright jurisprudence on originality has
ever given the idea of “adopt[ing]” the work any real meaning or content, nor has either
suggested how such adoption is to occur. See id. Courts appear to regard his observation
about unintentional originality and its subsequent adoption as “dictum.” See Godinger
Silver Art Co. v. Int’l Silver Co., No. 95 CIV. 9199 (LMM), 1995 WL 702357, at *2 n.5
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 1995).
237. See, e.g., Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1267–
68 (10th Cir. 2008); Entm’t Research Grp. v. Genesis Creative Grp., 122 F.3d 1211, 1221–24
(9th Cir. 1997); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910–11 (2d Cir. 1980).
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on the part of the author.238 Instead, the court emphasized that the
creativity—mandated by the originality requirement—had to be found in
the choices and decisions made by the author, manifested in the work itself
rather than in the creative process.239 Creativity is thus measured by its
manifestation as an act of authorship, which in turn precludes any
reliance on “skill, training, knowledge and judgment” that cannot be
discerned from the work itself.240 This approach has obvious benefits,
especially as a probative matter, in keeping indistinguishable variations of
a work that may have been produced through purely creative means out
of the realm of protection.241 Yet, in terms of causation, it poses obvious
problems. By precluding any scrutiny of the creative process involved in
the production of a work when that process has no direct embodiment in
the final product (i.e., the work), the originality doctrine denies courts
the ability to scrutinize the author’s causal contribution to the work.
Originality therefore does very little for authorial causation. Even if
originality is “synonymous” with authorship today, its connection to the
functional dimension of authorship—as embodying a causal element—is
at best superficial. Indeed, one might go further by noting that this
superficial connection has been actively detrimental to copyright’s
commitment to authorial causation, insofar as the originality require-
ment falsely suggests that it embodies a scrutiny of causation (“owes”)
but all too readily presumes the question away.
The monkey-selfie episode aptly illustrates this superficiality. Recall
that the photograph in the monkey-selfie episode was presumptively
denied copyright protection on the theory that it was the monkey—
rather than the photographer—who had pressed the shutter button.242
Given the absence of an “authorship” doctrine in copyright, one might
believe that originality provided the system with a basis for the denial. On
further consideration, however, originality would have had little to say
about the photograph. To begin with, the photograph clearly satisfied
the claim that it “owes” its existence to the photographer.243 It certainly
was not copied from another source (i.e., it was independently cre-
ated).244 The fact that it owes its existence to the monkey—rather than
238. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 352–60.
239. See id.; Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1268 (“[I]n assessing the originality of a work for
which copyright protection is sought, we look only at the final product, not the process.”).
240. 1 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 28, § 2.01[A].
241. See L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490–92 (2d Cir. 1976)
(explaining the requirement that the author must have contributed more than a “trivial
variation” and finding a metal “Uncle Sam bank” unprotectable on the basis of that
requirement).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 8–11.
243. Cf. Feist, 499 U.S. at 346 (discussing this requirement).
244. See supra notes 3–7 and accompanying text (noting the photographer had set up
the equipment with which the monkey took the photograph).
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the photographer—is of little concern to originality, since the doctrine
requires only independent creation in the noncopying sense of the
term.245 To use Judge Frank’s words, the photographer’s contribution
may have been “poor,” yet it was “his own.”246
Additionally, the requisite “modicum of creativity” was apparent on
the face of the photograph, which would satisfy the originality criteria set
forth by the various photography cases.247 The photograph was no
“ordinary production”;248 it involved specific lighting, zooming, position-
ing, and timing,249 all of which are inputs that one may glean from the
work itself and that operate as indicia of originality for photographs.250
The photographer’s button-pressing activity (or the lack thereof), which
was the real basis for the denial,251 thus would not have been subject to
scrutiny under originality’s minimal-creativity standard, being detached
from any outward manifestations in the photograph itself. Indeed, short
of the photographer explaining how the photograph was produced,
copyright law would have provided no basis whatsoever to deny the work
protection.
Under current originality doctrine, then, the monkey selfie would
obtain copyright protection without issue. Assuming that there is some
valid basis for the legal conclusion that it ought not to receive protec-
tion—such as a concern with authorial causation—originality simply does
not provide the law with any way to address that concern. Even if
originality is otherwise a notional stand-in for authorship in the modern
context, it does so through the “work of authorship” construct and not as
authorship qua act of authoring.
B. Joint Works
The joint works doctrine allows multiple authors to simultaneously
qualify as coauthors of a work, even in the absence of an express
agreement between them.252 The Copyright Act defines a joint work as
245. See supra notes 232–237 and accompanying text (explaining that the “owing
requirement” amounts to “a simple noncopying mandate”).
246. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951).
247. Cf. Hughes, supra note 136, at 365–68 & nn.150–151 (providing an exhaustive
account of originality criteria in photographs and criticizing these criteria’s utility).
248. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884).
249. See Sulawesi Macaques . . ., supra note 2 (“So I put my camera on a tripod with a
very wide angle lens, settings configured such as predictive autofocus, motorwind, even a
flashgun, to give me a chance of a facial close up if they were to approach again for a
play.”).
250. See Hughes, supra note 136, at 401–19.
251. See U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium, supra note 8, § 313.2 (emphasizing the
fact that the monkey—not the human—had “taken” the photograph).
252. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “joint work”). See generally Shyamkrishna
Balganesh, Unplanned Coauthorship, 100 Va. L. Rev. 1683, 1695–99 (2014) [hereinafter
Balganesh, Unplanned Coauthorship] (describing the basics of the joint works doctrine);
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one “prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a
unitary whole.”253 However, courts developed the law relating to joint
works almost entirely on their own with very little legislative guidance.254
The sparse legislative history accompanying the statutory definition
emphasizes that the defining feature of joint authorship is the relevant
parties’ “intention, at the time the writing is done, that the parts be
absorbed or combined into an integrated unit.”255 Courts have, as a
result, come to pay close attention to this requirement in giving effect to
the doctrine.256
As should be apparent, the joint works doctrine allows multiple
parties to claim the status of author, albeit jointly.257 Consequently, even if
modern judges have cared very little about policing authorship in the
abstract, in relation to this particular doctrine, copyright law effectively
requires that each party independently qualify as an author. The joint
works doctrine therefore essentially tests authorship as a precondition to
a work being protected as a joint work. Based on copyright jurispru-
dence’s historic—but hidden—resort to causal principles,258 then, one
might legitimately expect courts’ application of the doctrine to incorpo-
rate elements of authorial causation as part of their authorship analyses.
However, to the extent that causation has factored into courts’ analyses, it
has mostly worked beneath the surface.
Parsing the statutory definition of a joint work and its legislative
history, courts have understood the joint works doctrine to embody two
interrelated requirements. First, each party or claimant must have
contributed protectable expression to the final work.259 Since authorship
requires the production of expression (as opposed to mere ideas), courts
have seen joint authorship—as a category of authorship—as requiring
nothing less.260 While the expressive contribution need not be inde-
Laura G. Lape, A Narrow View of Creative Cooperation: The Current State of Joint Work
Doctrine, 61 Alb. L. Rev. 43, 51–74 (1997) (discussing the joint works doctrine under the
Copyright Act of 1976).
253. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
254. Balganesh, Unplanned Coauthorship, supra note 252, at 1685.
255. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 120 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736.
256. See, e.g., Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 201–02 (2d Cir. 1998) (emphasizing
the necessity of “a specific finding of mutual intent”); Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13
F.3d 1061, 1068–69 (7th Cir. 1994) (requiring “each author intend that their respective
contributions be merged into a unitary whole”); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507–08
(2d Cir. 1991) (describing the authors’ intent as “the crucial aspect of joint authorship”).
257. See supra notes 252–253 and accompanying text.
258. See supra Part I.
259. See, e.g., Thomson, 147 F.3d at 200; Seshadri v. Kasraian, 130 F.3d 798, 803–04 (7th
Cir. 1997); Childress, 945 F.2d at 505–07.
260. See, e.g., Childress, 945 F.2d at 506–07.
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pendently copyrightable, it must qualify for protection in principle.261
Second, the parties need to have had an intention to be joint authors, a
requirement that is often described as that of “mutual intent.”262 Once
both elements are satisfied, each joint author obtains an equal ownership
stake in the work, regardless of the amount or quality of expressive
contribution made to its creation.263 This last point bears emphasis: A
contributor to a 1,000-page original book who contributes a mere page
or two of original content automatically obtains a per capita share in the
ownership of the copyright in the book if the creation of the work
evinces the requisite mutual intent. This consequential reality of the
doctrine may seem innocuous at first. Yet in practice, it exerts a
potentially enormous influence on courts’ willingness to qualify an
unequal contributor as a joint author, even when in principle the
doctrine necessitates according the contributor such status.
Unsurprisingly, courts’ preferred mechanism for policing authorship
status in joint works is not an independent-contribution requirement.
Instead, courts do so through the mutual intent requirement. To give
effect to this requirement, courts have developed various “objective
indicia” through which to assess the existence of such intent, although in
reality, these indicia work as external, objective measures of author-
ship.264 These indicia include control and decisionmaking authority, the
way in which the parties characterize or bill themselves, agreements with
third parties, and copyright registration.265 Assuming that each of these
indicators provides objective evidence of the parties’ thinking at the time
of creation, courts have used them to find either for or against the
existence of joint authorship.266
In reality, however, these objective indicia have at best a tangential
connection to the parties’ intent accompanying the creation of the work.
The element of control, for instance, says very little about the presence
or absence of such intent.267 Two or more collaborators may well possess
the required intent to be joint authors, while nonetheless agreeing that
one of them—for reasons of expertise or expediency—is to exercise sole
control or decisionmaking authority during the production of the work.
261. Id. (defining the requirement as that of a “copyrightable contribution”).
262. Brown v. Flowers, 196 F. App’x 178, 186 (4th Cir. 2006); Thomson, 147 F.3d at 201;
Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1068 (7th Cir. 1994); Childress, 945 F.2d at
507.
263. Richlin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Inc., 531 F.3d 962, 968 (9th Cir. 2008);
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1988); 1 Nimmer
& Nimmer, supra note 28, § 6.08.
264. See, e.g., Thomson, 147 F.3d at 201; Tang v. Putruss, 521 F. Supp. 2d 600, 607 (E.D.
Mich. 2007).
265. 2 William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright § 5:22 (2016).
266. See, e.g., Thomson, 147 F.3d at 201–05.
267. Balganesh, Unplanned Coauthorship, supra note 252, at 1738.
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In such situations, the absence of diffuse control over the process (or the
presence of unilateral control) says less about intent than it does about
the law’s (i.e., courts’) willingness to accord the noncontrolling party the
status of author. In short, control and the other indicia function as
proxies not for intent but for the question of whether the creation of the
(joint) work ought to be ascribed to a particular party based on that
party’s role in the creative process—a question of causation.
A prominent case applying the indicia illustrates this well. In
Aalmuhammed v. Lee, the defendants were the director and producers of
the well-known motion picture Malcolm X.268 The primary defendant,
Spike Lee, had authored the screenplay and directed and coproduced
the movie.269 During production, the lead actor in the movie, Denzel
Washington, asked the plaintiff to “assist him in his preparation for the
starring role” due to the plaintiff’s expertise on Malcolm X and Islam.270
Agreeing to Washington’s request, the plaintiff “suggested extensive
script revisions” to ensure historical and religious accuracy, many of
which were included in the final version.271 He also presented uncontro-
verted evidence that he created two entirely new scenes, translated
Arabic into English, supplied voice-overs for several scenes, selected
“proper prayers” for some scenes, and even edited portions of the
motion picture following production.272 The plaintiff had no written
agreement with the defendants but received compensation for his
efforts.273 When the producers later credited him merely as an Islamic
consultant, he claimed to be a coauthor of the movie and filed an action
under the joint works doctrine for an accounting and share of the
movie’s profits.274
In reviewing the matter, the Ninth Circuit conceded that the
plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to establish an expressive
contribution to the work, satisfying the first prong of the joint works
doctrine.275 All the same, the court concluded that he did not qualify as
an author of the work even though he made “substantial and valuable
contributions” and perhaps even a “substantial creative contribution.”276
Relying on Burrow-Giles for its understanding of the author as the
“effective cause” of the work, the court, placing great emphasis on the
requirement of “mutual intent,” concluded that superintendence over
the work “by exercising control” over its production was critical to joint
268. 202 F.3d 1227, 1229–30 (9th Cir. 2000).
269. Id. at 1229.
270. Id.




275. Id. at 1231–32.
276. Id. at 1231, 1233.
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authorship.277 Control, to the court, was “the most important factor,” and
since the plaintiff did not have superintendence or control of the work
(or indeed any other evidence of mutual intent), he did not qualify as a
(joint) author of the work.278 In essence, the court converted the intent
requirement into a proxy for causation—and did so rather explicitly.
Control was—the court effectively conceded—central to intent in order
to show authorial causation and therefore authorship.279 Aalmuhammed is
but an extreme—and honest—illustration of what other courts continue
to do less overtly.280
Scholars have criticized the Aalmuhammed decision on a variety of
grounds.281 For present purposes, though, the opinion is also troubling
because it attempts to mask the causal question that is central to joint
authorship behind the idea of mutual intent, a requirement that
lawmakers designed to assess the existence of a particular collaborative
mindset in the production of the work.282 As should be obvious, of
consequence to the court was the fact that even though the plaintiff had
made some contribution to the work, that contribution was negligible
compared to that of the defendants, and yet the joint works doctrine
would have entitled the plaintiff to an equal ownership share in the work.
What the court was really asking, then, was whether the plaintiff’s
contribution should be treated as a cause for the work as a whole, in light
of the obvious consequence at stake—namely, equal ownership.283
Although the court answered this in the negative, it chose to do so under
the garb of mutual intent rather than directly.284
277. Id. at 1233–34.
278. Id. at 1234–36.
279. Cf. id. at 1234 (discussing Burrow-Giles’s “effective cause” requirement in the
context of the control factor).
280. See, e.g., Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 202–03 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting
decisionmaking authority is “[a]n important indicator of authorship” and weighing the
putative authors’ authority over the work’s content); Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13
F.3d 1061, 1071–72 (7th Cir. 1994) (reasoning that an actor’s suggestion to include a
passage in a play did not make him a joint author of the play because the ultimate decision
laid with the playwright).
281. See, e.g., Balganesh, Unplanned Coauthorship, supra note 252, at 1748 n.261; F.
Jay Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee Joint? Issues in the Authorship of Motion Pictures Under
U.S. Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 225, 275–76 (2001); Mary LaFrance, Authorship,
Dominance, and the Captive Collaborator: Preserving the Rights of Joint Authors, 50
Emory L.J. 193, 246–55 (2001).
282. See supra notes 252–256 and accompanying text (noting the legislative history’s
emphasis on the parties’ mutual intent to combine the individual parts into a unified
whole).
283. The court’s motivation in this regard is revealed by its description of the
plaintiff’s quantum meruit argument. In that discussion, the court concedes that the
plaintiff “made a substantial contribution to the film.” Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1236.
The court then observed that this claim was different from a joint authorship claim in that
the allegation was the nonpayment of “the fair value of his services.” Id.
284. Id. at 1235.
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In this domain, the causal inquiry is principally relative and
evaluative, rather than absolute and epistemic. The causal question is
clearly imbued with an evaluative dimension. The assessment is not
merely whether something can be attributed to a party as a factual matter
but instead whether it should be so attributed in light of the conse-
quences that follow. Other courts have, in similar fashion, employed the
mutual intent analysis to arrive at a different outcome when satisfied that
a party’s contributions were sufficiently causal for the person to qualify as
co-responsible for the entire final product.285
The joint works doctrine thus incorporates a distinct causal
dimension, which courts only ever operationalize through the mutual
intent analysis. In scrutinizing the process of creation in some detail,
copyright law here is in effect examining the causal sufficiency of each
party’s contribution to the final work to see if each party merits a coequal
characterization as author of the work. While authorial causation is
therefore a core component of the inquiry, it remains well hidden
underneath the metaphysics of mutual intent and is almost never openly
addressed as such.
C. Works Made for Hire
A third area in which copyright doctrine indirectly engages the
question of authorial causation is the work made for hire doctrine. The
work made for hire doctrine allows copyright law to accord authorial
(and ownership) status to one party when another created the work in its
entirety.286 The law allows this imputation in three scenarios: first, when
one party has commissioned a work from another and the parties
expressly agree to treat the work as a work made for hire; second, when a
formal employment arrangement exists and the employee created the
work within the scope of the employment; and third, when an employ-
ment arrangement may be implied from the nature of the relationship
between the parties.287
It is important to appreciate that the doctrine does not merely effect
an implied transfer of ownership. It is instead a doctrine of first author-
ship, under which the employer (or commissioning party) is treated as
the author and creator of the work from the moment that the work
obtains copyright protection.288 And underlying the doctrine’s treatment
of authorship is a nascent—and undoubtedly controversial—account of
285. See, e.g., Brod v. Gen. Publ’g Grp., 32 F. App’x 231, 234–35 (9th Cir. 2002);
Strauss v. Hearst Corp., No. 85 Civ. 10017 (CSH), 1988 WL 18932, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
19, 1988).
286. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “work made for hire”).
287. See id.
288. See id. § 201(b) (“In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other
person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author . . . .”).
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causation. As noted previously, early copyright law did not recognize an
employer as author of a work merely based on the employment relation-
ship.289 This position continued into the late nineteenth century.290 As
Professor Catherine Fisk documents in her exhaustive historical analysis
of the work made for hire doctrine, it was at this juncture—the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—that things began to change.291
Changes in the U.S. economy at the time, accompanied by the
increasing popularity of the corporate form, produced a gradual
willingness among courts to treat corporate employers as authors under
copyright law.292 These cases all seemed to commit to a rather
fundamental idea—namely, that because the employer had invested
monetarily in the production of the work by hiring employees who
actually executed the project, that investment was sufficient to generate a
claim of authorship.293 The monetary investment, in other words, was
deemed causally relevant and sufficient to produce the status of author.
One early court put the point most starkly: “The complainant’s [i.e.,
employer’s] money paid for the painting; its artist colored it; its president
designed it, his was the ‘originating, inventive, and master mind.’”294
To be sure, some observers have noted an “artificiality” in the work
for hire doctrine’s treatment of the employer as author even when the
employer has played no role whatsoever in the actual creative process.295
The doctrine, in this understanding, has more to do with facilitating
“investment and exploitation” than any commitment to authorship
principles.296 While this characterization may indeed be accurate, this
artificiality does not necessarily negate the doctrine’s underlying account
of authorial causation. Insofar as such causation is more than just
epistemic and embodies normative considerations—that is, the evaluative
dimension—one might fairly see the doctrine as specifying a causal
nexus. As shall become apparent, this causal nexus forms a symmetrical
289. See supra text accompanying notes 76–88 (explaining that English courts
required a “compositional” contribution).
290. Catherine L. Fisk, Authors at Work: The Origins of the Work-for-Hire Doctrine,
15 Yale J.L. & Human. 1, 55 (2003).
291. Id. (“This shift began gradually after 1860 and rapidly accelerated after 1900.”).
292. See id. at 67–68 (noting that principal among these changes was the “rise of the
corporation”).
293. Id. at 55–59.
294. Schumacher v. Schwencke, 25 F. 466, 468 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885).
295. See Borge Varmer, Study No. 13, Works Made for Hire and on Commission (Apr.
1958), in Staff of S. Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks & Copyrights, 86th Cong.,
Copyright Law Revision 123, 139 (Comm. Print 1960) (“[I]t may be argued that the
concept of designating the employer as the author of an intellectual creation of another
person is artificial . . . .”). The Copyright Office produced this study of the subject in 1958
during the copyright revisions leading up to the 1976 statute. See Copyright Law Revision,
supra, at v.
296. Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 1088–89.
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analog to the causal theory underlying tort law’s doctrine of vicarious
liability.297
In describing the work made for hire doctrine, Professor Peter Jaszi
argues that it takes copyright’s concept of authorship to its instrumental
extreme and adopts the logic that “[i]f the essence of ‘authorship’ is
inspiration, then it is the ‘employer’s’ contribution as the ‘motivating factor’
behind that work . . . that matters.”298 Insofar as authorial causation—
embodied in authorship—always entailed an instrumental and evaluative
dimension, however, the work made for hire doctrine is hardly an
aberration from that framework.
The work made for hire doctrine thus represents an additional
domain in which copyright jurisprudence embodies an important causal
aspect. Unlike in other areas, however, here the doctrine itself articulates
and assumes a specific causal paradigm, wherein the law automatically
imputes authorial causation to one actor merely by virtue of a
relationship without any need for independent evidence (of
causation).299 The doctrine thus renders the epistemic dimension of
authorial causation fairly thin (and close to nonexistent, but for the need
to show an employment relationship or contract) in the process.
* * *
Authorial causation is hardly alien to modern copyright law. It
remains embedded in copyright’s various doctrinal devices, in which its
role and significance fluctuates with the vagaries of how the particular
doctrine (in which it resides) grows and evolves. Given the originality
doctrine’s modern rejection of “sweat of the brow” and its limited focus
on noncopying and independent creation to determine origination,
authorial causation has no doctrinal platform to function as a threshold
qualification criterion in general copyright law.300 The same is true of the
joint works doctrine, in which the law’s enduring focus on mutual intent
to reconstruct the creative process masks the role of authorial causation,
and courts rarely even acknowledge causation as a motivating considera-
tion during their analyses.301 Within the work made for hire doctrine,
297. See infra notes 423–428 and accompanying text.
298. Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective
Creativity, in The Construction of Authorship, supra note 54, at 29, 34 (quoting Picture
Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972)).
299. See supra notes 286–288 and accompanying text (describing how the work for
hire doctrine automatically vests authorship in employers).
300. See supra section II.A (explaining how the originality doctrine as interpreted in
Feist and its progeny does not facilitate explicit assessment of authorial causation).
301. See supra section II.B (arguing that courts rarely acknowledge the causal
underpinnings of their mutual intent analyses and citing Aalmuhammed v. Lee as a rare
exception with more overt reference to causality).
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authorial causation plays a principally structural role, insofar as it forms
the very foundation for the doctrine and its default of employer owner-
ship, on the assumption that the relevant relationship exists between the
parties.302
Authorial causation, then, in both its epistemic and evaluative
aspects, as well as its relative and absolute ones, is hidden within
copyright doctrine. Whenever courts need to directly address the
causation question—as in the monkey-selfie episode303 or with machine
creation304—they are left without any doctrinal device to aid their
analyses, forcing them to fall back on first principles—a move that some
observers may in turn see as suspect given the otherwise comprehensive
nature of copyright doctrine. An express acknowledgement of authorial
causation within copyright jurisprudence—and allowing its various
components (epistemic–evaluative, etc.) to work freely within the system—
would therefore better serve copyright law. The next Part turns to this
ideal.
III. COPYRIGHTABLE CAUSATION
Having seen how copyright jurisprudence embodies a commitment
to identifying the appropriate human cause for the creation of a work
and the ways in which modern copyright doctrine prevents that causal
inquiry from rising to the surface, this Part moves to the prescriptive and
advances a proposal to remedy this anomaly. Building on copyright’s
latent theory of authorial causation, this Part suggests a mechanism by
which copyright analysis and reasoning might fruitfully make authorial
causation—in both its epistemic and evaluative aspects—a part of the
copyrightability analysis for original works of expression.
Determining whether a work of expression is eligible for copyright
protection today—otherwise known as the question of “copyrighta-
bility”—entails examining the work to ensure that it contains protectable
expression (as opposed to ideas and other excluded content); that it
meets the originality requirement; and that it otherwise complies with
the requirements of the Copyright Act (e.g., fixation).305 The inquiry into
copyrightability, in other words, is limited to a scrutiny of the four
corners of the work and no more. The particulars of the process through
302. See supra section II.C (describing how the work for hire doctrine automatically
vests authorship status in one party without a probing inquiry into the creative process).
303. See supra notes 1–11 and accompanying text (recounting the monkey-selfie
episode and the reasoning underlying the Copyright Office’s related decision).
304. See supra notes 145–146 and accompanying text (observing that there are
outstanding issues related to determining “the appropriate role of human agency” in
computer-generated works).
305. See U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium, supra note 8, § 303; 1 Nimmer &
Nimmer, supra note 28, § 2.
48 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 117:1
which the author has created the work are, according to this account of
copyrightability, largely irrelevant. Much of this myopia very likely derives
from modern copyright law’s conception of originality, which forces
courts to ignore the creative process and limit themselves to expressive
manifestations within the work.306
While this limit may make sense for originality after Feist, it is hardly
a limiting principle that demands adherence across all of copyright’s
eligibility criteria. Indeed, copyright doctrine itself contemplates
situations in which a scrutiny of factors other than the content of the
work becomes essential to determine copyrightability. The prime
example of this is U.S. government works, which the Copyright Act
denies protection altogether.307 Bare scrutiny of the work itself is likely to
yield little information about its eligibility for protection, which instead
relates to the identity of its author. It is only when a party has produced
additional information about the work’s creation (e.g., the identity of its
author, the circumstances of its creation, etc.) that the exclusion kicks
in.308 Consequently, it is no major analytical stretch to require that a
condition of copyrightability originate outside the contours of the work
itself, specifically in the process through which the author brings the
work into existence. This is precisely how copyright doctrine ought to
address authorial causation.
Authorial causation is therefore best addressed within copyright
jurisprudence as an independent condition of eligibility for protection:
copyrightable causation. For a work to qualify for copyright protection as a
work of authorship, the work would have to be the result of human
agency that is treated as causally relevant to, and sufficient for, copyright
law. Much like copyright’s several other conditions for copyrightability,309
the burden of establishing copyrightable causation would be on the
plaintiff or claimant seeking protection, as part of the plaintiff’s prima
facie case. In an action for copyright infringement, the law places the
306. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 360 (1991) (quoting
approvingly a case that focused its originality analysis on “the selection and arrangement
of the factual material, rather than on the industriousness of the efforts to develop the
information” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Miller v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1369–70 (5th Cir. 1981))); 1 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 28,
§ 2.01[A].
307. See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2012).
308. See 1 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 28, § 5.13[B] (discussing how the
relationship between the author of the work and the government requires scrutiny for the
disqualification to apply).
309. 4 id. § 13.01[A] (observing that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving
ownership and copying in an infringement lawsuit and that ownership involves
establishing “copyrightability”).
2017] CAUSING COPYRIGHT 49
burden of establishing ownership of a “valid copyright” on a plaintiff,310
which would now encompass copyrightable causation as an additional
facet. And much like the law’s other copyrightability requirements (e.g.,
originality or subject matter), copyrightable causation is unlikely to be a
contested issue in an overwhelming majority of cases. Only when the
matter is contested, or when presented with evidence that calls the
existence of such causation into question, would a court be required to
resolve the matter as a precursor to the infringement inquiry. This would
in turn allow the law to retain its de facto assumption of copyrightability
by default, which in turn sustains copyright’s system of automatic
protection.
In situations in which a court must resolve the issue of causation,
copyright jurisprudence would benefit from a framework for giving effect
to the copyrightable-causation requirement. In developing this frame-
work, negligence law sheds important light on how the causal inquiry
might be bifurcated, so as to keep the epistemic and evaluative aspects of
the inquiry relatively distinct. The common law’s well-known divide
between the “cause in fact” and “proximate causation” inquiries serves as
a useful model that courts might adapt to the requirements of copyright
law. The remainder of this Part attempts to build on that model and
develop a two-step mechanism for copyrightable causation. Section III.A
begins by looking to the basic structural ideas behind tort law’s approach
to causation to show how it embodies important symmetries for the
working of copyrightable causation. Sections III.B and III.C then attempt
to integrate the equivalents of the cause in fact and proximate cause
steps into the working of copyrightable causation in order to give effect
to copyright’s theory of authorial causation.
A. Basic Structure: The Tort Law Analogy
The question of causation has been a source of much disagreement
and theorizing in the world of tort law for nearly a century now.311
310. Feist, 499 U.S. at 361 (describing the elements that the plaintiff must prove and
identifying ownership of a “valid copyright” as an integral component); 4 Nimmer &
Nimmer, supra note 28, § 13.01 (describing and synthesizing these elements).
311. See, e.g., Green, Proximate Cause, supra note 36, at v; Hart & Honoré, supra
note 22, at 436; Moore, Causation and Responsibility, supra note 22, at 3. For a sampling
of other pieces that analyze the role of causation in tort law, see generally Larry A.
Alexander, Causation and Corrective Justice: Does Tort Law Make Sense?, 6 Law & Phil. 1
(1987); Joseph H. Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 633
(1920); J.H. Beale, Jr., Recovery for Consequences of an Act, 9 Harv. L. Rev. 80 (1895);
Charles E. Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause, 20 Calif. L. Rev.
229 (1932); Henry W. Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. Pa. L. Rev. 211 (1924); Arthur L.
Goodhart, The Unforeseeable Consequences of a Negligent Act, 39 Yale L.J. 449 (1930);
Green, Dependable Rules, supra note 35; Charles O. Gregory, Proximate Cause in
Negligence—A Retreat from “Rationalization,” 6 U. Chi. L. Rev. 36 (1938); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J. Legal
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Indeed, the literature on the role and test of causation therein is far too
extensive to allow for a compact synthesis here. Nonetheless, the struc-
tural features of tort (i.e., negligence) law’s operationalization of the
causal inquiry is of direct relevance for copyright law. The law’s efforts to
hold an actor responsible for a particular consequence (i.e., harm) that
deserves rectification is widely accepted to drive tort law’s understanding
of causation as a component of liability determination.312 Causation is
therefore indelibly connected to responsibility.313 This connection in-
flects the causal determination with points of emphasis that an abstract
(purely scientific) conception of the idea might otherwise lack.
It is indeed the centrality of this connection that forces the courts to
look for, and classify, a human act as the cause of relevance from a host of
background conditions. Some scholars refer to this as the idea of “causal
selection,” a view that is traced back to John Stuart Mill.314 The causal-
selection theory readily acknowledges that this selection process has no
universally objective basis but is instead pragmatic in content and
situation driven.315 Causal selection understands tort law’s identification
of an act as a cause as driven by the law’s attempt to apportion blame for
a consequence on a human actor.316 Causation in tort law therefore takes
shape from a nascent understanding of responsibility or blame-
worthiness—ideas that embody an account of moral agency, however
deep or shallow that account may be as an independent substantive
matter.317 Identifying an actor’s intervention as a cause in tort law’s
liability calculus therefore is accompanied and driven by the understand-
Stud. 109 (1983); Albert Levitt, Cause, Legal Cause and Proximate Cause, 21 Mich. L. Rev.
34 (1922); James Angell McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 149 (1925);
Roscoe Pound, Causation, 67 Yale L.J. 1 (1957); Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation
and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. Legal Stud. 463 (1980); Wright, supra
note 22.
312. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 22, at 1826 (“[S]o long as tort liability continues to
be based on individual responsibility, liability will be imposed on a defendant only if it is
believed that the tortious aspect of his conduct actually contributed to the specified legal
injury . . . [,] [a belief that] is the essence of a causal explanation.”).
313. Moore, Causation and Responsibility, supra note 22, at 3–19.
314. See John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic 198 (N.Y.C., Harper & Bros. 1846)
(“Nothing can better show the absence of any scientific ground for the distinction
between the cause of a phenomenon and its conditions, than the capricious manner in
which we select from among the conditions that which we choose to denominate the
cause.”); see also Germund Hesslow, The Problem of Causal Selection, in Contemporary
Science and Natural Explanation: Commonsense Conceptions of Causality 11, 14–15, 24
(Denis J. Hilton ed., 1988).
315. See Mill, supra note 314, at 198; Hesslow, supra note 314, at 11–31.
316. Wright, supra note 22, at 1744.
317. See Moore, Causation and Responsibility, supra note 22, at 20; Alex Broadbent,
Explanation and Responsibility, in Critical Essays on “Causation and Responsibility” 239,
241 (Benedikt Kahmen & Markus Stepanians eds., 2013). For a deeper substantive
account, see Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 407
(1987).
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ing that the actor’s rational agency is worthier than the various back-
ground conditions of being selected as the cause of the event. This
causation–responsibility connection is therefore an enduring feature of
tort law’s approach to the question of causation.
However, this connection is far more important as a phenome-
nological observation about the nature of the causal inquiry. Most
fundamentally, it reveals that the question of causation—regardless of the
particular setting within which it is employed—is indelibly purposive in
content and operation. The ultimate purpose of the inquiry motivates
and informs the identification and selection of a factor or condition as a
cause. This point is largely unexceptional but rarely acknowledged. In his
well-known discussion of factual causation in tort law, Professor Wex
Malone thus made the following observation:
[T]he evaluation which the trier will make of the new fact data
will necessarily be affected by the purpose he is seeking to serve.
This is particularly true of cause, which, as we have seen, is
merely an acceptable deduction from evidential facts. All
deductions are drawn purposively—that is to say, they are drawn
for a reason.318
Malone went on to illustrate this by showing that for a single occurrence,
a physicist’s sense of the cause was likely different from an engineer’s,
which might in turn be different from a lawyer’s.319 The purpose of the
inquiry thus guides the construction of causation.320
From this, Malone—a legal realist—readily inferred that the factual
aspect of causation inevitably masked policy decisions and that fact and
policy were inextricably linked even in the supposedly factual elements of
causation.321 Yet acknowledging the purposive nature of the inquiry need
not negate the existence of a factual basis for it. What Malone’s analysis
does reveal is that even the principally epistemic aspects of the causal
inquiry are hardly objective in the sense of being universalizable across
different contexts and these epistemic elements embody some evaluative
content that is driven by the reason for the inquiry. The “cause in fact”
aspect of causation in tort law is therefore hardly a search for some
objectively verifiable truth (e.g., was the defendant’s car green in color?)
but is instead an attempt to select from among a finite set of epistemically
verifiable conditions in an effort to affix responsibility for a negative
outcome (i.e., the “reason”).
318. Malone, supra note 35, at 62.
319. See id.
320. Id. at 62–64.
321. Id. at 64 (“It is through the process of selecting what is to be regarded as a cause
for the purpose of resolving a legal dispute that considerations of policy exert their
influence in deciding an issue of cause-in-fact.”).
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Scholars have since come to interpret Malone’s observations as
being critical of tort law’s causal inquiry.322 Nevertheless, his argument
provides strong support for tort law’s bifurcation of the causal inquiry:
cause in fact and proximate cause. Owing to the purposive nature of the
determination, each step certainly involves an epistemic and evaluative
component. As Malone himself acknowledged, the degree and nature of
evaluation that accompanies each step varies rather significantly.323 In the
first, the purposiveness injects an evaluative component into what
appears to be a purely factual determination. But it does so in the con-
struction of the inquiry and by altering the salience of particular factual
conditions over others, thereby operating as a structural influence. In the
second, by contrast, the question of ideal tort policy builds on the
conclusion of the first step but individualizes the evaluative component
to the facts and circumstances of the case at hand. The proximate cause
inquiry is thus less about the abstract purpose of tort law than it is about
whether the tort defendant in a given case should—as a matter of tort
policy—be deemed causally responsible as a legal matter. Here, it is
critical to note that the evaluative component is analytically different in
both steps. In the first, it is merely a suggestion that any analysis of facts is
driven by an end, while in the latter, it is an overt recognition that the
analysis incorporates the goals of the system or regime.
Of the various aspects of causation in tort law that have received
scholarly attention, proximate cause undoubtedly remains the most
controversial.324 While related to the factual-causation question, in reality
it operates as a doctrine that courts use to limit a defendant’s liability
under certain circumstances by determining that the defendant’s
actions—even if causally related to the harm—should not be the basis for
imposing liability. And to determine proximate causation, they look to
the basic normative goals of the system, thereby giving the inquiry an
avowedly “policy-oriented” flavor.325 The specific variables to which
courts look range from abstract ideals such as justice and equity to more
practical goals such as compensation and deterrence.326 Courts also look
to utilitarian considerations such as risk allocation, as well as deontic
322. See, e.g., Hart & Honoré, supra note 22, at 413; Moore, Causation and
Responsibility, supra note 22, at 91.
323. See Malone, supra note 35, at 97–99 (describing the distinction as a matter of
degree rather than of kind).
324. See, e.g., Green, Proximate Cause, supra note 36, at v (“It is no doubt generally
felt that the whole subject of ‘proximate causation’ is a bogey, the sort of thing found only
in children’s story books—a sort of child’s mind creation.”).
325. See, e.g., Pittway Corp. v. Collins, 973 A.2d 771, 787 (Md. 2009) (“Legal causation
is a policy-oriented doctrine designed to be a method for limiting liability after cause-in-
fact has been established.”).
326. See Calabresi, supra note 36, at 73–108 (discussing the goals of compensation,
deterrence, and risk spreading).
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ideas such as moral responsibility.327 All in all, the determination is
heavily driven by a subjective judgment that the courts make of whether a
defendant should be found responsible for the harm in light of tort law’s
myriad goals.328 Here too, then, the purpose of responsibility affixation
motivates the causal investigation—of whether an identified factual cause
is proximate enough to engender liability—but manifests itself in a
determination that is specific to the defendant.
These basic structural ideas are illuminating for copyright law.
Copyrightable causation need not be seen as a purely objective or
scientific inquiry that is true across situation and context. Nor, of course,
should courts treat it as an entirely vacuous concept that is devoid of all
verifiable analytical content and subject to covert manipulation. Building
on the insights that legal realism has brought to bear on the understand-
ing of causation in other areas of law, courts might fruitfully bifurcate
copyrightable causation. In the first prong, the epistemic content—
driven by the purpose of the inquiry—would dominate, and in the
second prong, normative considerations would play a more direct role.
Separating the inquiry into two steps allows for full consideration and
independent analytical scrutiny of each of the epistemic and evaluative
domains, even if one considers their boundaries somewhat porous. The
remainder of this Part thus turns to constructing this bifurcated inquiry,
building on the architecture of the causal determination in tort law.
B. Creation in Fact
The first step of the copyrightable-causation requirement would look
for an epistemic basis to causally relate the work in question to an actor’s
creative actions. In essence, this step would track tort law’s cause in fact
requirement. Notably, identifying—and selecting—a condition as the
“cause” for the work is not a purely objective or universal determination;
it is instead driven by the purpose of the inquiry as a whole.
To reiterate, it is important not to confuse “purpose” with policy
considerations or normative goals. The reference to purpose is simply an
acknowledgement of Mill’s unexceptional point that causality can be an
unending sequence and that some ultimate purpose always drives even
the factual identification of a cause.329 As an illustration, consider a
murder investigation. It would be insufficient to simply conclude that the
cause of death was poisoning without going further and identifying the
327. See id. at 74–76, 81–84 (discussing the value of risk spreading and deterrence);
Christopher H. Schroeder, Causation, Compensation and Moral Responsibility, in
Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law 347, 349 (David G. Owen ed., 1995); Shavell, supra
note 311, at 465 (arguing proximate cause can be explained in economic terms).
328. See Dan B. Dobbs et al., The Law of Torts §§ 198–199 (2d ed. 2015) (describing
both “principled” and “practical” justifications for proximate cause limitations on
liability).
329. See Mill, supra note 314, at 198.
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human agent who committed that act. Our very understanding of
cause—in relation to a homicide investigation—involves a focus on a
human agent, in an effort to hold someone responsible. Identifying a
human agent is thus the purpose of the causal inquiry.
So it is with tort law too. Whereas tort law uses causation to affix
liability, copyright law’s identification of the cause originates in its need
to attribute authorship and assign ownership. This purpose would exert
an obvious influence on the structure and content of the inquiry. In
contrast to tort law, copyright’s authorship determination allocates an
exclusive entitlement over expression to the causally responsible individual.330
Devoid of such purpose, copyright’s creation-in-fact inquiry is likely to be
of little utility to authorship.
According to the Supreme Court’s current understanding, copyright
law grants its exclusionary entitlement to individuals as an inducement
for creative activity that results in social-welfare–enhancing output.331
Consequently, the Court’s account of incentives is closely tied to an
account of human behavior in which individuals are able to respond
rationally to the law’s “promise” of protection for original expression.332
This focus on a creator’s exercise of rational human agency, both in the
lead up to the creation of the work and in the exercise of the exclu-
sionary entitlement once granted, excludes any consideration of non-
human factors from the set of conditions that might ever qualify as
causes for authorship. Creation in fact is therefore about epistemically
identifying the responsible human agency.
Responsibility for outcomes can produce liability, as it does in tort
law. Such responsibility can also produce rights when the outcome is
positive. In his account of “outcome responsibility” in tort law, Professor
Tony Honoré famously defended forms of liability that are based on
actual outcomes as representing a social norm that the law incorporates
into its functioning.333 According to this norm, individuals who “have a
330. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (declaring that the owner of copyright has certain
exclusive rights to do or authorize specific actions related to the protected expression); id.
§ 201(a) (vesting ownership of copyright in the author).
331. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)
(“By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting copyright’s basis
in the belief that its grant of exclusive rights gives authors “an incentive to create, and that
‘encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare’” (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954))).
332. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 Harv. L.
Rev. 1569, 1573 (2009) [hereinafter Balganesh, Foreseeability].
333. See Tony Honoré, Responsibility and Fault 14–15 (2002) (“Outcome
responsibility is . . . inescapable because it is the counterpart and at the same time a
constituent of our personal identity and character.”). For a set of essays critically
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minimum capacity for choosing and acting” receive credit for the “good
outcomes of action” and “discredit for bad ones” on an everyday basis as
a matter of basic social morality.334 Tort law builds on this moral account
of discredit. Copyright law, symmetrically, constitutes a mechanism for
giving credit and according responsibility—through the mechanism of a
right—for good outcomes.335 In assigning authorship, copyright law
(much like tort law) is therefore about allocating responsibility for an
outcome, except that the allocation is of a positive one rather than a
negative one. Once one accepts this responsibility-centered understand-
ing of authorship, the focus on human agency for determining the cause
becomes even more obvious. In this account, copyright law can treat
neither animals nor machines nor indeed divine spirits as causally
responsible for the creation of a work, just as tort law does not hold them
causally responsible for any real-world harms. Whenever they enter the
fray, the question must invariably turn on whether there is a human
agent that might be responsible for the output that comes from such
sources. The domain of authorial causality is, in short, limited to that of
human agency: a causally responsible individual.
1. But-for Creation. — The principal test that courts use for factual
causation in tort law is the “but-for test.”336 In its principal formulation,
the test provides that “the defendant’s conduct is a factual cause of the
plaintiff’s harm if, but-for the defendant’s conduct, that harm would not
have occurred.”337 As a leading treatise on the subject further notes, this
formulation of the test also embodies a negative: the absence of a causal
connection in situations in which the plaintiff would likely have suffered
the same harm even without the defendant’s conduct.338
When confronting issues of authorial causation, courts have long
attempted to apply a basic but-for approach, albeit sporadically.339 The
basic framework of tort law would now enable copyright to develop a
more refined application of the but-for test for authorial causation.
Under this Article’s proposed formulation, an individual claimant should
be treated as having caused the creation of the work—as a matter of
authorship—if, but for that individual’s actions, the particular work of
examining the various dimensions of this argument, see Relating to Responsibility: Essays
for Tony Honoré on His Eightieth Birthday (Peter Cane & John Gardner eds., 2001).
334. Honoré, supra note 333, at 14–15.
335. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normative Structure of Copyright Law, in
Intellectual Property and the Common Law, supra note 216, at 313, 326–30 (connecting
copyright law with Honoré’s account of outcome responsibility).
336. Dobbs et al., supra note 328, § 186 (“In the great mass of cases, courts apply a
but-for test to determine whether the defendant’s conduct was a factual cause of the
plaintiff’s harm . . . .”).
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. See supra section I.A (collecting cases that manifest a but-for approach to
authorial causation).
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expression in question would not have come into existence. Since this is
principally an epistemic question, it bears emphasizing that each
individual determination is specific to the particular work at issue. It
therefore matters very little if someone else brought a substantially
similar, analogous, or identical work into existence.
In a vast majority of cases, but-for creation would be a straightfor-
ward question. When an individual acting in isolation writes a poem,
paints a picture, produces software code, or composes music, the result-
ing work would not have come into existence but for that individual’s
actions. Conversely, in situations in which the work would have come into
existence even without the individual’s actions, or despite the individual’s
minimal assistance therein, the but-for test suggests the absence of a
causal link.
A good example of this is seen in situations in which a work owes its
origins to forces of nature. Suppose that the owner of a private beach
who maintains the beach and cleans it on a regular basis discovers an
aesthetically appealing sand pattern produced by the waves one morning.
Under the but-for test, if another individual likes that pattern and
decides to replicate it, the beach owner cannot thereafter claim author-
ship in the design as a work of art. Because the pattern at issue would
have come into existence even without the owner’s actions, the but-for-
creation test does not award authorship status to the owner. Conversely,
consider the monkey-selfie episode discussed previously. Without the
photographer’s positioning of the camera and his adjustment of the
various lens and shutter settings, the monkey would likely not have
pressed the shutter button, which in turn resulted in the production of
the final photograph.340 While the monkey was certainly the most
immediate cause of the photograph (because it pressed the button), the
photographer’s actions clearly meet the but-for-creation test.
In applying the but-for-creation test, courts would usually need to
recreate a hypothetical counterfactual situation to assess whether the
work would have come into existence even without the claimant’s
intervention. In most instances, this would likely be relatively
uncontroversial—as in the beach-pattern and monkey-selfie scenarios,
which entail objective causal determinations involving a single human
actor. Once one moves from absolute situations to relative situations,
which involve multiple actors, things start becoming more complex. In
these situations, one begins to encounter what theorists of causation
refer to as overdetermined causation (i.e., situations in which a single
340. See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text.
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outcome is in principle determined by multiple causes).341 Here, too,
copyright law might once again learn from the common law of torts.
2. Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set (NESS). — Scholars have usually
divided instances of overdetermined causation into the separate catego-
ries of “duplicative causation” and “preemptive causation.”342 Duplicative
causation refers to situations in which two or more causes combine
together to produce a result.343 For instance, two individual fires might
combine together to produce a large inferno that destroys a house.344
Preemptive causation, on the other hand, arises when one cause follows
another to produce a result, with the latter cause usually cutting short
the former.345 For example, suppose that one person gives another a
lethal dose of poison, which the victim ingests. But just before the poison
can take effect, someone else shoots and kills the victim. Here, the
second cause (the gunshot) preempts the first (the poison) and cuts it
short. In all of these situations, untangling the independent causal
significance of each cause becomes complicated under the simple but-for
test.
Overdetermined causation arises in copyright principally when
multiple contributors produce a single work. It would be most accurate
to characterize these multiple-contributor situations as instances of
“multiple causation” rather than as duplicative or preemptive causation.
Since copyright law provides for careful scrutiny of each individual
contribution under the originality doctrine,346 creation in fact can never
be truly duplicative, strictly speaking. Additionally, in the creative
context, one creator’s contributions cannot preempt another’s; rather,
the contributions build on one another, meaning that causation is
seldom preempted. Joint works are almost by definition the result of
multiple causal influences,347 requiring the law to disaggregate the autho-
rial significance of each of them.
One might further classify instances of multiple causation in
copyright into “joint causation” and “sequential causation,” a distinction
that roughly tracks the law’s analytical distinction between joint works
341. See Hart & Honoré, supra note 22, at xxxix–xlii (describing theories of “causal
overdetermination”); Louis E. Loeb, Causal Theories and Causal Overdetermination, 71 J.
Phil. 525, 526 (1974).
342. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 22, at 1775.
343. Id.
344. For the source of this classic hypothetical, see Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. &
S.S.M. Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45, 56 (Minn. 1920).
345. Wright, supra note 22, at 1775.
346. Cf. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348–49 (1991)
(explaining the limitations the originality doctrine imposes).
347. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining a “joint work” as one “prepared by two or
more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or
interdependent parts of a unitary whole”).
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and derivative works.348 The gravamen of the distinction lies in the
manner in which the contributors to the work interact.
Consider the following illustration of joint causation. Two artists
work together on creating a painting on canvas. They work in tandem,
each contributing various colored shapes and lines to the work during
the process. In the final work, their individual contributions remain
interrelated and indistinguishable, both in quality and quantity. The final
work is clearly a product of both of their contributions. Here it is
impossible—applying the simple but-for-creation test—to say if the work
of art would have come into being with just one of their contributions in
isolation. In principle, one could argue that neither artist’s actions would
independently satisfy the but-for-creation standard on their own, since
one could counterfactually hypothesize that either artist’s contribution
might have produced the work.
Next, consider a situation of sequential causation. One artist creates
a work of modern art on her own. Some time thereafter, another artist
comes along and, with permission from the first artist,349 copies and
modifies the first artist’s work rather significantly to produce a new,
original work of modern art (i.e., a derivative work). The new work is
clearly a product of both artists’ contributions. But for either artist’s
contribution, it would simply not exist.
In the first situation, the but-for test is underinclusive—both authors
fail the test—and in the second, it is overinclusive—both authors satisfy
the test. How should the creation-in-fact analysis proceed in these
situations? Theorists of causation in the law, beginning with Professors
H.L.A. Hart and Honoré in their classic work on the subject, have
developed an alternative to the but-for test in situations of causal
overdetermination that has since come to be known as the Necessary
Element of a Sufficient Set (NESS) test.350 The NESS test asks if the
condition at issue was a critical element of a set of antecedent actual
conditions that was—as a whole—sufficient for the consequence to
occur; if answered in the affirmative, the NESS test treats the condition as
348. See Balganesh, Unplanned Coauthorship, supra note 252, at 1733 (characterizing
copyright law’s distinction between joint works and derivative works as embodying an
intention to distinguish between time-of-creation and postcreation merger of creative
contributions). The legislative history accompanying the current copyright statute suggests
this distinction as well. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 120 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736 (noting that even if an author created a work with the
expectation it would be adapted into a motion picture, the lack of a “basic intention
behind the writing of the work” for it to be integrated renders it a derivative as opposed to
joint work).
349. The hypothetical above uses permission as a stand-in for the critical requirement
that the derivative not be “unlawfully” created under the statute. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a). If this
requirement is not met, the question of infringing the original creator’s exclusive right to
produce a derivative enters the picture. Id. § 106(2).
350. See Hart & Honoré, supra note 22, at 109–29.
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a cause.351 The most sophisticated treatment of the NESS test can be
found in the work of Professor Richard Wright, who argues that its virtue
lies in the fact that it “incorporates the indispensable notion of necessity,
but subordinates it to the notion of sufficiency.”352
The NESS test operates to modify the traditional but-for approach.
In duplicative causation situations (e.g., the inferno produced by two
fires), the NESS test treats both causes as factual causes in the
recognition that each is a necessary element of a set of actual conditions
that includes the other fire.353 In preemptive causation cases (e.g., the
poisoning–shooting situations), the NESS test would find the preemptive
cause (the shooting) to be a factual cause while exempting the preempted
cause (the poison) since the latter was not a necessary element of a set of
actual conditions that produced the result.354
As applied to the overdetermination cases in copyright law (i.e.,
situations of multiple causation), the NESS test also fares significantly
better than but-for causation. In instances of joint causation, it produces
affirmative answers for both actors’ involvement, thereby treating them
each as a cause of the consequence under study. This lies in contrast to
the conclusion under a but-for test. Returning to the earlier example of
joint causation involving the two artists, the NESS test would ask if each
artist’s contribution was a necessary element of the set of actual
antecedent conditions that includes both artists’ contributions in which
that set was sufficient for the creation of the particular final work that
emerged. Even if each artist’s contribution to the work may not have
been independently necessary for the final work (something that is
impossible to discern ex post), each was certainly necessary for the
sufficiency of the actual set of antecedent conditions that did produce
the work.
The NESS test would thus treat both contributions as causally related
to the work, not just individually but also jointly. Consequently, the NESS
test would attribute causality to each contribution regardless of its precise
magnitude or importance. Thus, if one contributor made a fairly
minimal contribution and the other conversely did most of the work, the
test would treat the quantum of the contribution as irrelevant to the
causal determination since each is a necessary part of the complete
actual set.355 The law might more appropriately deal with the conse-
quence of this disparity in actual contribution elsewhere rather than in
351. Id.
352. Wright, supra note 22, at 1788–1803.
353. See id. at 1793–94.
354. Id. at 1795.
355. This is consistent with the current functioning of the joint works doctrine. See
Balganesh, Unplanned Coauthorship, supra note 252, at 1703 (“[C]opyright law pays no
attention to the relative contributions of the parties, and as a result recognizes each
coauthor to have an equal ownership stake in the work in question.”).
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the causal inquiry.356 For example, courts could pay attention to
contribution-related disparities when determining the parties’ respective
ownership shares, which would in turn translate into a division of any
revenues (or damages) along the lines of those shares.
Sequential causation presents a more complicated story. Here, both
the but-for and NESS tests point in the same direction: Both authors are
causally responsible for the creation of the work. Because the derivative
author’s contributions never preempt the original author’s contribution,
the two overlap and fall back into the broad category of duplicative
causation. And here, each author’s agency is indelibly a necessary part of
the set of actual conditions that resulted in the production of the final
product (i.e., the derivative work). If one were to remove the original
author’s contribution from the set, there would be no work from which
to create the derivative work; conversely, if one were to remove the
derivative author’s contributions, there would be no derivative work at
all. Consequently, the NESS test yields the result that both the creator of
the original work and the creator of the derivative work are creators in
fact of the derivative work as a matter of cause in fact. In this regard, the
NESS test deals with sequential causation and joint causation in a largely
identical fashion.
At first glance, treating both authors’ contributions as epistemic causes
in sequential-causation situations (i.e., derivative work situations) may
seem counterintuitive. On closer scrutiny, however, one realizes that the
NESS test tracks copyright law’s basic principles about derivative
authorship, such as the need to keep the rights in a lawful derivative work
distinct from those in the original.357 Copyright scholars have long
356. See Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Justin Hughes,
Peter Menell, and David Nimmer in Support of Neither Party at 17–21, Garcia v. Google,
Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 12-57302) (arguing that “neither Congressional
intent nor the common law” supports the idea that each joint author is “necessarily
entitled to coequal sharing of the fruits of the collaborative enterprise”).
357. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2012) (providing that copyright in a derivative work
“does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material”). Derivative works, by
definition, build on “preexisting” works, which may have already obtained copyright
protection. In recognizing that the introduction of additional creativity in the
transformation, adaptation, or modification of the preexisting work to create a derivative
work is worthy of protection, modern copyright law does three things simultaneously. First,
it denies protection for a derivative when the use of the preexisting work was unlawful. See
id. § 103(a); Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87–0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *9 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 25, 1989). Second, when a derivative work is lawfully created, the law accords
protection only to the original contributions of the derivative author. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 103(b); Entm’t Research Grp. v. Genesis Creative Grp., 122 F.3d 1211, 1218–20 (9th Cir.
1997) (interpreting § 103(b) to extend derivative protection to only “original aspects” of
the derivative that are “more than trivial” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir. 1980))). Third, the law
seeks to ensure that the protection so given to the derivative work does not interfere with
the protection that the preexisting work receives, either by expanding or diminishing such
protection for the preexisting work. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b).
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debated—and tried to understand—why copyright law accords authors of
original works the right to control the creation of derivatives even when
this creation involves its own element of originality.358 As this Article’s
discussion on “legal creation” will make clear, the law does moderate this
control in important ways.359 But ultimately, the significant control over
downstream derivatives granted to original authors may derive from the
recognition that as a purely epistemic matter, the original author plays a
crucial role in causing the derivative to come into existence. Of course, it
remains an independent question whether this epistemic causality ought
to serve as a legal basis for authorship—a question that the next step in
the copyrightable-causation test (and indeed, copyright law more gener-
ally) addresses.
The NESS test therefore allows for scrutiny under the creation-in-
fact inquiry of situations of multiple causation in which the but-for test is
overdeterminative in identifying the cause of a work. It bears emphasis
that that the answer to the creation in fact step remains defeasible as a
matter of copyright policy, a scrutiny that will take place under the rubric
of legal creation.
C. Legal Creation
As discussed in the previous section, the creation-in-fact step of the
copyrightable-causation requirement would enable a court to choose one
among the various conditions and influences that contributed to the
final creation of the work as the relevant human agency of authorial
significance. Its focus would principally be epistemic and premised on
the patterns of cause and effect observed in human behavior in various
contexts. This section focuses on the next step of the inquiry: “legal
creation.” Unlike creation-in-fact, the legal-creation analysis would be
largely evaluative. Legal creation asks whether the identified human
agency ought to lead to an authorship claim as a matter of copyright’s
goals and principles, even after the court has epistemically identified that
agency as the cause of the work.
Legal creation would track tort law’s proximate cause requirement,
which commentators have understood as an inquiry that determines the
appropriate scope of an actor’s liability even when that actor is an
358. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Conception of Copyright’s
Derivative Work Right, 101 Geo. L.J. 1505, 1554–58 (2013). For other prior efforts to
develop theoretical justifications for the right, see generally Michael Abramowicz, A
Theory of Copyright’s Derivative Right and Related Doctrines, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 317 (2005)
(developing a spatial-competition-based justification for the derivative works right); Paul
Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. Copyright Soc’y
U.S.A. 209 (1983) (developing an incentive-based justification for the right).
359. See infra section III.C.3 (explaining how a “personality-conflation principle”
tracks the law’s treatment of derivative works).
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epistemic cause for the harm at issue.360 Proximate cause tries to ensure
that the defendant’s liability in tort law bears a connection to the harm
that is justifiable as a matter of tort law’s understood goals and objec-
tives.361 As an illustration, consider a computer manufacturer whose
negligently produced product requires a customer to visit a repair shop.
En route to the repair shop, the customer is seriously injured in an
automobile accident. The manufacturer is clearly an epistemic cause for
the injury: But for the faulty product, the trip would have never
occurred, and the manufacturer’s faulty production is a necessary
element of a sufficient set of conditions that produced the injury.362 And
yet, in a claim for negligence, a court is likely to conclude that the negli-
gent behavior (of the manufacturer) was not the proximate cause of the
injury.363 Why? Because as a matter of tort law’s commonly understood
goals—for example, of incentivizing careful behavior or of attributing
moral blameworthiness—characterizing the manufacturer as the legal
cause for the injury seems incongruous.364
To give effect to these various goals, which are a source of some
contention among tort scholars, tort law has developed a variety of tests
for proximate cause, the most prominent of which is the foreseeability
test.365 Uniquely developed for tort law, foreseeability fits both the
instrumental and the moral justifications for the imposition of tort
liability.366 Some scholars have described foreseeability as a principle that
takes shape and color by reference to certain important normative ideals
but allows courts (or other decisionmakers) to avoid direct recourse to
those ideals when actually applying the doctrine.367 In this regard,
foreseeability prioritizes analytical content over the normative in its
application, even though the normative motivates its very existence.
360. See Dobbs et al., supra note 328, § 199.
361. Id.
362. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 273 (5th ed.
1984).
363. Cf. Dobbs et al., supra note 328, § 200 (“If the thief who finds the owner’s keys in
the car drives safely away, sells the car to a dealer, who sells it to a retired lawyer, most
courts will undoubtedly conclude that the lawyer’s negligence in driving the car . . . is not
proximately caused by the [car’s owner].”).
364. Cf. id. § 199 (arguing, based on “principled” justifications, that “if the defendant
is considered to be negligent only because it makes a vacuum cleaner that does not clean
well, it should not be held liable when the purchaser is in an automobile accident while
taking the cleaner to be repaired”).
365. Id.
366. See, e.g., W. Jonathan Cardi, Reconstructing Foreseeability, 46 B.C. L. Rev. 921,
940–59 (2005).
367. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause,
44 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1247, 1249–51 (2009) (describing how foreseeability is used in one
context to give effect to the famous Learned Hand formula for determining negligence).
For a fuller connection between foreseeability and moral accounts of tort law, see Stephen
R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 449, 505 (1992).
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In a similar vein, courts or lawmakers might identify a set of midlevel
principles for the legal-creation inquiry to give effect to copyright’s goals
and ideals during the assessment of copyrightable causation. Much as the
proximate cause inquiry introduces a set of criteria to exclude otherwise
epistemically viable causes from the legal assessment,368 these principles
would operate to preclude certain forms of human agency from quali-
fying as authorial causes. In this respect, legal creation would perform a
largely exclusionary role.
An important caveat is in order before identifying the midlevel
principles through which legal creation might operate. While these
principles—like those in proximate cause—would function to give effect
to the institution’s fundamental goals and ideals, they would do so only
through the epistemic cause identified in the prior step (i.e., creation in
fact) and never independently. In this sense, then, legal creation would
always be parasitic on the epistemic aspect of copyrightable causation
rather than an independent vehicle to give effect to copyright’s goals.
Just as proximate cause is materially distinct from the question of
whether the law ought to identify a duty of care to exist at all for liability
purposes,369 one should not view legal creation as just another mecha-
nism by which to calibrate the copyright entitlement. Rather, legal
creation would be a device that lays copyright’s normative considerations
over the epistemic cause for the work at issue.
Identifying copyright’s normative objectives remains a source of
deep disagreement among scholars.370 Generally speaking, scholars have
identified these goals in principally instrumental terms.371 By providing
creators with a marketable set of exclusive rights in their works, copyright
law induces the creation of new works, thereby promoting overall social
welfare (“progress”).372 Incentives, allocative efficiency, and social-welfare
maximization thus lie at the root of this account.373 The incentives
368. See Pittway Corp. v. Collins, 973 A.2d 771, 788 (Md. 2009) (“Legal causation is a
policy-oriented doctrine designed to be a method for limiting liability after cause-in-fact
has been established.”).
369. Dobbs et al., supra note 328, § 200.
370. See, e.g., Peter Baldwin, The Copyright Wars: Three Centuries of Trans-Atlantic
Battle 14–52 (2014); Abraham Drassinower, What’s Wrong with Copying? 17–53 (2015);
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox 154–68 (2008); Shyamkrishna Balganesh,
The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law: Unbundling the Wrong of Copying, 125 Harv.
L. Rev. 1664, 1677–82 (2012); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325, 326–33 (1989) [hereinafter Landes &
Posner, Economic Analysis of Copyright Law]; Balganesh, Debunking Blackstonian
Copyright, supra note 51, at 1132–42.
371. See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 370, at 154–68; Landes & Posner, Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 370, at 325–26.
372. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
373. See Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 370, at
325, 332, 339–41.
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rationale contrasts with less instrumentally focused rationales, which
connect copyright to the morality or intrinsic worth of authorship as an
activity.374 Whereas the instrumental conception focuses on the utilitarian
benefits of copyright, the deontic conception emphasizes the relation-
ship between author and expression as embodying an inner rationality
worthy of protection on its own.375 The author’s individual dignity
anchors the foundations of this theory.376
Over the years, scholars have tried to offer accounts that reconcile
these competing ideas, with varying degrees of success.377 Nonetheless,
midlevel principles that inform the application of a doctrine enable
courts to avoid choosing between competing normative ideals or recon-
ciling them on an individual basis.378 The very construction of these
principles allows them to embrace an institution’s goals to different
extents without necessitating a direct trade-off, except in very rare
instances. Looking back to the ways in which copyright jurisprudence has
attempted to address the causal question in the past (both directly and
through its other doctrines), as well as copyright’s normative commit-
ments detailed above, reveals three general midlevel principles through
which the legal-creation prong of copyrightable causation might be
operationalized: control,379 disproportionality,380 and personality confla-
tion.381 It bears emphasizing that because these principles belong to the
exclusionary prong of copyrightable causation, each principle operates
in the negative—that is, if applicable, the principle disqualifies a work
that has satisfied the creation-in-fact requirement.
1. Control. — When a putative creator of a work has exercised
insufficient control over the process leading to its creation, courts should
deem the contribution insufficient to satisfy the legal-creation prong of
copyrightable causation. Creating a work usually entails numerous steps,
beginning with the conception of the underlying idea and ending with
the fixation of specific expression.382 Given that copyright’s principal
374. See Drassinower, supra note 370, at 7–9; Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Soul of
Creativity: Forging a Moral Rights Law for the United States 1–9 (2010).
375. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Immanent Rationality of Copyright Law, 115
Mich. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017) (reviewing Drassinower, supra note 370) (manuscript at
4–6) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
376. See id. (manuscript at 10–11).
377. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Justifying Intellectual Property 9–27 (2011);
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 Duke L.J. 203,
242–60 (2012); Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 Va. L.
Rev. 1745, 1759–89 (2012).
378. Merges, supra note 377, at 146.
379. Infra section III.C.1.
380. Infra section III.C.2.
381. Infra section III.C.3.
382. See, e.g., Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. 982 F.2d 693, 697–98 (2d Cir.
1992) (discussing the steps involved in creating computer software).
2017] CAUSING COPYRIGHT 65
focus is the expression being created, the sufficiency (of control) under
scrutiny should be limited to that part of the creative process in which
the original expression formed. While obviously a contextual question, it
is likely to arise in three scenarios.
The first involves situations in which a nonhuman influence that is
not under the direction of the human agent played a substantial role in
the production of the expression, best described as instances of
“undirected nonhuman influence.” The crucial element here is the
inability of the human agent under the circumstances to direct (and
control) the production of the expression, even if the nonhuman
element was predictable based on natural or artificial conditions. These
kinds of situations arise when the creative process involves undirected
natural processes, as was the case in the monkey-selfie episode. There,
the photographer was causally responsible as an epistemic matter for the
origins of the ultimate expression;383 yet, in terms of creative process, he
relied entirely on the undirected activities of the macaque monkey for
the ultimate expression.384 Even if the primate’s actions were completely
predictable, courts should treat the photographer as disqualified from
protection under this prong. Critically, this conclusion does not simply
result from the photographer’s reliance on a monkey. If a trained
monkey or some other animal that the photographer had controlled had
been responsible for the photograph, then the animal’s involvement
would be both predictable and directed rather than undirected, which
would have in turn potentially qualified the photographer as an author.
A second scenario in which control over the creative process might
be lacking arises when an “element of chance” (or luck) plays a major
role in the creation of the expression. This would cover situations in
which the claimant produced the work by accident, such as when an
artist slips and spills a set of colors onto a canvas, thereby generating an
aesthetically appealing pattern. Determining when (and how) chance
enters the creative process is of course a fact-intensive inquiry, and a
putative creator may deny its presence altogether.385 Yet, when shown to
exist in significant part, this element of chance reveals the creative
process to have been substantially stochastic.
The third possibility arises within relative agency determinations and
involves situations in which another human agent (or multiple agents)
not under the supervision or direction of the putative claimant produces
the expression at issue—appropriately described as a “nonservient
383. See supra note 340 and accompanying text (noting the photographer’s actions
were necessary before the monkey could take the photograph).
384. See supra notes 1–11 and accompanying text (explaining the photographer’s
involvement was limited to setting up the equipment).
385. But see Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 104–05 (2d Cir.
1951) (alluding to evidence that the putative creator may have inadvertently produced
copyrightable expression).
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human influence.” The most common instance of this scenario involves a
work commissioned from an independent contractor who is not in a
hierarchical relationship with the commissioning party.386 If the relation-
ship is such that the independent contractor has sufficient independent
agency in producing the work, the commissioning party’s claim to
authorship is appropriately defeated.
Of course, situations in which one or more of these categories
overlap can arise. For instance, one might explain the monkey-selfie
episode387 as involving both a heightened element of chance and a
significant undirected influence. But the unifying feature of this category
is the claimant’s inability to replicate the outcome of the creative
process.388
Denying the status of authorship to works produced under these
circumstances tests copyright law’s commitment to enhancing social
welfare by inducing the production of creative expression. A central
premise of this inducement account involves the law’s ability to rationally
influence future actors to produce creative works through its set of
incentives.389 When the claimant has exercised very little control over the
creative process, one may plausibly infer that the prospect of obtaining
copyright protection likely did not influence or induce the claimant’s
creative expression in any significant manner, making the claimant
undeserving of protection under the inducement account. In other
words, when the role of rational agency in the production of the work is
limited, one can legitimately call into question copyright’s role in ration-
ally influencing that agency. The inadequacy-of-control principle is thus
unquestionably utilitarian in orientation, originating in copyright’s
welfarist theory of incentives.
At the same time, it is important to appreciate that complete control is
not necessary to satisfy the legal-creation test. Many forms of creativity
that should legitimately receive protection embody an element of chance
within their means of production. The question in each instance is the
ratio of control to chance underlying the creative process. An artist’s
chance production of an additional lighting effect by mixing two shades
of color on a portrait is vastly different from an artist’s accidental, undi-
rected spillage of paint onto a canvas that happens to produce an
abstract shape. Both involve chance—and indeed some control—but the
386. See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 752–53 (1989)
(finding an independent contractor who had contracted with the plaintiff to produce a
sculpture to be a nonemployee and therefore outside the plaintiff’s control).
387. See supra notes 1–11 and accompanying text.
388. In a sense, there is also a lack of intentionality during the creative process, either
consciously or by circumstance. See Nimmer, Dead Sea Scrolls, supra note 21, at 204–07
(“[I]t would seem that intent is a necessary element of the act of authorship.”).
389. See Balganesh, Foreseeability, supra note 332, at 1573.
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ratio varies. The control principle would merely force courts to grapple
with the working of this ratio in individual domains of creativity.
2. Disproportionality.— In some situations, the characterization of an
individual who plays some epistemically verifiable role in the creation of
a work as the work’s author is disproportionate to the (1) quality, (2)
quantum, or (3) monetary value of that individual’s contribution during
the creative process. In these situations, the legal-creation prong would
weigh against the existence of copyrightable causation on the part of that
individual. The primary domain in which one would expect to see this
principle at work relates to relative (rather than absolute) agency
determinations—situations in which one individual’s contribution to the
work is assessed against a baseline of other actors’ similar contributions.
This principle focuses on the intuitive mismatch between the actor’s
role in the creation of a work and the final consequences of authorship,
which can be monetary, attributional, or distributional. Monetary conse-
quences are the most straightforward and relate to the claimant’s ability
to lay claim to the market for the work at issue. Attributional conse-
quences, by contrast, are less overtly instrumental and instead derive
from the perceived unfairness of allowing the claimant to obtain
exclusive credit as responsible for the creation of the work. This credit
routinely carries significant reputational advantages for the claimant and
disadvantages for those excluded. Frequently, the monetary and attribu-
tional consequences will influence the determination in tandem.
Distributional consequences regularly arise when a claimant seeks
not exclusive authorship but rather joint authorship. Here, the baseline
of comparison—with other contributors to the work—is not just about
choosing one among them as the work’s author but instead determining
whether more than one merits the status equally. The law’s treatment of
joint authors as equal co-owners, in which each author’s ownership stake
or right is equal to the other’s regardless of the precise contribution
made to the work, generates the impulse to deny legal creation
altogether because of the disproportionality in contribution.390
The monetary and attributional consequences play out in courts’
willingness to recognize directors and producers of motion pictures as
their authors even when a film involves multiple performers and
contributors.391 The implicit rationale here is that the director has made
the most significant contribution to the creative process. The director’s
contribution is therefore taken as fair and proportional to the exclusivity
being granted. This lies in contrast with, say, a cameraman’s contribution
390. See, e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000) (“A creative
contribution does not suffice to establish authorship of the movie.”).
391. See, e.g., Lindsay v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic, No. 97 Civ.
9248(HB), 1999 WL 816163, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1999) (finding that a motion picture’s
director qualified as its author even though others operated the cameras).
68 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 117:1
to a movie or a consultant’s contribution to a screenplay.392 Legal
creation—as well as current law393—would find these contributions
insufficient to qualify for protection either as exclusive claims or as joint
claims. As exclusive claims, they represent rather significant mismatches
between the contributions and the consequences (full ownership and
sole attribution). As joint claims, the contributions seem significantly less
substantial—both quantitatively and qualitatively—than those of the
other claimants to authorship (e.g., the director), which renders the
authorship claims disproportionate from a distributive standpoint.
As a theoretical matter, considerations of desert motivate the
disproportionality principle discussed here. As an ex post consideration,
legal claims based on desert recognize that by virtue of someone’s actions
at a certain point in time, the law ought to do something beneficial for
them on that basis.394 Desert considerations are thus infused with a
strong ethical claim that can exist independently of consequentialist
justifications.395 The argument that a contributor deserves to be classified
as the legal creator (i.e., author) of the work by virtue of her contribu-
tions may thus serve as a claim about the virtue of that contribution—
independently of whether the classification might enhance overall utility,
either in the individual case or over the long term.
All the same, as some philosophers have argued, one can under-
stand desert itself as motivated by consequentialist considerations.396
According to this view, the virtue at issue—in the contribution—is
beneficial not just for the particular work or for authorship, but instead
systemically (i.e., to stimulate further productions of such virtue), and
desert begins to partake of a strong consequentialist or utilitarian color.
Here the distinction—for the causal principle of disproportionality—
between desert and reward begins to collapse. Yet the fact of the matter
remains that the principle at issue here is capable of being understood in
principally ethical or deontic terms. Whether that deontic logic might
itself form part of an overall consequentialist system remains a separate
issue.
3. Personality Conflation. — A third principle undergirding legal crea-
tion would focus on copyright law’s need to identify and distinguish one
392. See Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1233–34.
393. See id. at 1233–35.
394. See Owen McLeod, Desert, Stan. Encyclopedia of Phil., http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/win2013/entries/desert/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated
Nov. 12, 2008). For a general application of desert principles to intellectual property, see
Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 609
(1993).
395. McLeod, supra note 394.
396. See Fred Feldman, Adjusting Utility for Justice: A Consequentialist Reply to the
Objection from Justice, 55 Phil. & Phenomenological Res. 567, 572–85 (1995) (developing
a desert-sensitive version of consequentialism).
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author’s individual creative choices from those of another (or others)
when the works that embody these choices are themselves interrelated.
In these situations, even though it might be epistemically defensible to
identify one creator (i.e., author) as causally linked to every work that
derives from it, one might consider the causal nexus severed when the
importance of those individual creative choices is conflated.
A stylized example helps illustrate the working of this principle.
Consider an original work of fiction written by A and a sequential series
of lawful derivative works397 each produced by a different author. B
directs and produces a motion picture based on the novel produced by
A. C then writes a children’s short story based on the characters and
storyline in B’s motion picture, which D then translates into another
language. In producing his work, B modifies and adapts A’s work, C
similarly does so with B’s work, and D with C’s work. Now, as a purely
epistemic matter, A is causally responsible for all four works, B for three
of them, and C for two. In this sequence, one can thus causally link each
creator not only to her individual work but to subsequent derivatives as
well. For instance, without A’s contribution, none of the works—however
original and creative they may each be—would be in existence.
All the same, treating A as the legal creator (i.e., author) of all
subsequent works merely because of this causal connection seems absurd.
It elides the fundamental point that even if A contributed causally to
each of the works, her contribution was less significant to those
subsequent works than each of the others’ contributions was. Indeed,
continuing to treat A as causally responsible conflates the creative
choices that B, C, and D each made in producing their works with A’s and
treats them as coequal analytically. In these situations, legal creation
treats A’s causal link to the work as broken and does the same for B and C
with regard to the works that C and D respectively produced.
Indeed, this position appears to track the law’s treatment of deriva-
tive works. The Copyright Act expressly provides that the copyrightability
of a derivative work “is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge
the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection
397. The Copyright Act defines a derivative work as a “work based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionaliza-
tion, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensa-
tion, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (2012). The term “lawful” tracks the statute’s requirement that a derivative not be
unlawfully created. Id. § 103(a). Examples of circumstances that render such derivative
creation lawful include consent from the owner of copyright in the preexisting work and
fair use. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 58 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5671 (identifying “fair use” as an example of lawful creation); 1 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra
note 28, § 3.06 (discussing the role of consent in rendering the creation lawful and
concluding that such consent is illustrative of lawfulness but not exhaustive of it).
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in the preexisting material.”398 While the author of the preexisting
work—A, in our example—may claim an ownership interest in portions
of her work that were used in the subsequent derivatives, she does not
thereby become a coauthor of those subsequent derivatives,399 which
tracks the principle articulated here. The legislative history of the
Copyright Act explicitly confirms this reading of the Act: Congress chose
to deny the status of author (i.e., coauthor) to individual authors whose
works were incorporated into lawful derivatives.400
The personality-conflation principle is essentially a test of remote-
ness.401 When the original author’s individual creative choices are too far
removed from the derivative works eventually created, such that contin-
uing to treat the new creator’s choices as causally related to the original
creator’s choices clouds the salience of the new creator’s own choices,
the principle suggests that courts should deny authorship status to the
claimant. This does not necessarily mean that the new creators’ choices
are independently worthy of protection under the originality standard.
Rather, the originality determination is altogether separate from
copyrightable causation. While originality focuses exclusively on the new
creator’s choices, copyrightable causation—through the personality-
conflation factor—focuses on the distance between the original author’s
choices and new work. Note also that the concern about conflation arises
only when the derivative works in question are produced lawfully. When
the legality of those works is itself at issue, an altogether different set of
considerations apply.402
Personality conflation gives limited effect to the idea that
authorship—and authorial causation—involves infusing a work with an
author’s personality, manifested in the author’s individual creative
choices during the creative process. While the factor does not treat
personality as an independent basis for protection, it would, to the extent
that the creation-in-fact inquiry obfuscates authorial personality, militate
against a finding of copyrightable causation. In a sense, then, the
principle accommodates aspects of deontic (or rights-based) accounts of
copyright law, which justify the system by emphasizing the author’s
398. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b).
399. See id. (distinguishing the “preexisting material” used in a derivative work from
the material contributed by the derivative work’s author and providing that the derivative
work’s copyright “does not affect . . . any copyright protection in the preexisting material”).
400. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 120, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5736 (rejecting
the concern that the definition of joint works would convert “the authors of previously
written works, such as plays, novels, and music, into coauthors of a . . . [derivative] in
which their work is incorporated”).
401. Cf. Dobbs et al., supra note 328, § 208 (describing the term “remote” in tort law
as the antonym of “proximate”).
402. See 1 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 28, § 3.06 (discussing the requirement that
the derivative work be produced lawfully and examining the consequences of unlawfully
using preexisting work to produce a derivative).
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relationship to the work. According to this account, obfuscating the
author’s personal choices that underlie the work is problematic because
it mischaracterizes the work as consisting merely of those choices’ results.
* * *
Copyrightable causation should be understood as a two-step inquiry.
The first step—creation in fact—would focus on the presence of an
epistemic basis for authorial causation, and the second step—legal
creation—would examine whether that epistemic basis is normatively
sufficient to identify the human agent as causally responsible for the
work created. The two steps are sequential in structure. Figure 1 below
shows their interaction and operation.
FIGURE 1: THE COPYRIGHTABLE-CAUSATION ANALYSIS
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IV. EXTENSIONS
Having examined how authorial causation might be made an
independent component of the copyrightability analysis through a
requirement of “copyrightable causation” in Part III, this Part considers
two extensions of the idea beyond a freestanding copyrightable-causation
analysis: (1) situations in which authorial causation is presumed as a
matter of law and (2) situations in which the law requires causation to be
transferred from one party to another.
A. Presumptive Causation
The discussion thus far has focused on a freestanding “copyrightable
causation” requirement that a plaintiff would need to establish as part of a
copyright infringement lawsuit and that a court would have to
adjudicate.403 As previously discussed, this determination would ulti-
mately contain both an epistemic404 and an evaluative component.405 As
should be obvious, this framework—much like in tort law—would place
the burden principally on courts, requiring them to determine (1) when
and how an agent’s actions are epistemically linked to creation and (2)
whether that epistemic link is normatively sufficient to constitute
authorship.406 The framework therefore presumes an implicit—or
explicit—congressional delegation of the causal question in copyright law
to courts.
All the same, copyright law might choose a different locus of institu-
tional authority for the question, rather than depending entirely on
courts.407 For example, Congress could address authorial causation
through statutory presumptions. These presumptions would attribute the
status of “author” to individuals who perform a pre-identified task during
the creative process that produced the work. The U.K. copyright statute
follows precisely such an approach by identifying the author for
particular categories of works based on the individuals’ respective
contributions:
[The author] shall be taken to be—
403. See supra Part III (proposing this requirement).
404. See supra section III.B (advancing “creation in fact” as the first step in the
copyrightable-causation inquiry).
405. See supra section III.C (suggesting “legal creation” as the second step in the
copyrightable-causation inquiry).
406. See supra sections III.B–.C (describing the two steps of this test).
407. For useful accounts of how and when federal statutory regimes divide up
institutional lawmaking authority between the different branches of government, see Sean
Farhang, The Litigation State: Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the U.S. (2010)
(developing an account of the Congress–judiciary relationship in the federal context);
Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and
Public Policy (1994) (developing an economic framework for institutional choice in
lawmaking).
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(aa) in the case of a sound recording, the producer;
(ab) in the case of a film, the producer and the principal director;
(b) in the case of a broadcast, the personmaking the broadcast . . . ;
(d) in the case of the typographical arrangement of a published
edition, the publisher.408
In each of these situations, the statute creates a presumption that
certain actions during the creative process automatically satisfy authorial
causation and qualify the individual as the author of a work.409 This
approach to authorial causation, best described as presumptive causation,
has certain obvious advantages when compared with a freestanding
requirement.
First, presumptions would introduce a degree of consistency in the
authorial determination for certain categories or classes of works. By
embedding a sticky default into the determination, presumptions allow
the law to accord creators a measure of ex ante certainty about their
status.410 For example, the law might—tracking the U.K. approach—
automatically presume the producer of a sound recording to have caused
its creation and therefore treat the producer as the work’s author even if
in that individual case the producer played no role whatsoever in the
creation of the recording. Second, and relatedly, presumptions would
lower the administrative cost on courts by eliminating the need for a
factual and normative determination for certain categories of work.411 A
presumptive approach would simply require courts to adjudicate whether
an individual falls into the identified status or category when that
characterization is unclear. In situations in which that classification (e.g.,
as a producer or principal director) is unambiguously clear, the causal
determination becomes somewhat mechanical. Third, a nimble and
adaptable presumption-based approach would avoid needless litigation
on the question of authorial causation in relation to new technologies
and creative mechanisms. Computer-generated works are a prime exam-
ple: While American copyright scholars continue to debate the ideal
approach to authorship of computer-generated works,412 the U.K. statute
408. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 9 (UK).
409. See Gerald Dworkin & Richard D. Taylor, Blackstone’s Guide to the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988, at 46–47 (1989).
410. Cf. Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121
Yale L.J. 2032, 2084–96 (2012) (discussing the phenomenon of stickiness relating to
default rules); Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules,
33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 651, 651–52 (2006) (same).
411. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 Calif. L. Rev. 953, 963, 972–74
(1995) (comparing presumptions to rules and discussing the efficiency benefits of rules).
412. See, e.g., Grimmelmann, Copyright for Literate Robots, supra note 56, at 661–74;
Grimmelmann, No Such Thing, supra note 56, at 408–14; Bridy, supra note 56, at 21–27.
For an early account of the problems in identifying authorship in computer-generated
works, see Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated
Works, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1185 (1986); see also Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for
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definitively declares that “the author shall be taken to be the person by
whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are
undertaken.”413 Notably, this declaration does not identify the authorial
cause by status or category, as it does for other types of creative works.
Instead, it effectively articulates a test—of authorial causation—to be
applied, which is then presumed to yield a determinate answer to the
question.
The U.S. Copyright Act obviously does not adopt the “presumptive
causation” approach to authorial causation in the manner seen in the
U.K. statute, given its refusal to even define who an “author” is under the
law.414 Congress instead appears fully content delegating the question to
courts, which can develop answers incrementally and contextually as
technology and creative mechanisms evolve.415 This is consistent with the
general willingness of American copyright law and jurisprudence to
embrace the common law method of rule development in a variety of
important—and controversial—domains.416 And at that stage, the trade-
off between the certainty of the presumptive approach and the flexibility
of the freestanding approach is likely to motivate much of the debate.
All the same, it is possible that Congress will—at some point in the
future—choose to adopt a statutory solution to the problem of causation,
analogous to the U.K. approach. Indeed, the Copyright Act’s treatment
of works that are specially commissioned or ordered for use “as a part of
a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supple-
mentary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as
answer material for a test, or as an atlas” suggests such an approach.417
For such works, if the parties enter into a written agreement that classi-
fies the work as a “work made for hire,”418 the law automatically treats the
commissioning or ordering party as the author (not just the owner) of
the work.419 Within this narrow domain, American copyright law thus
appears to already endorse a rule of presumptive causation in its
treatment of authorship.
Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since
CONTU?, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 977, 1042–72 (1993).
413. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 9(3); see also Dworkin & Taylor,
supra note 409, at 47 (discussing the U.K. approach to authorship of computer-generated
works).
414. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (noting the U.S. Copyright Act does
not define “authorship”).
415. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common Law
Intellectual Property, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1543, 1591–601 (2010).
416. See Balganesh, Debunking Blackstonian Copyright, supra note 51, at 1162–70.
417. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining the term “work made for hire”).
418. Id.
419. Id. § 201(b).
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B. Transferred Causation
There is one important area wherein American copyright law adopts
something akin to a presumptive approach to causation: the work made
for hire doctrine.420 One might describe the law’s approach to the work
made for hire doctrine as “transferred causation.” Under this doctrine,
the law deems one party to be the author of a work, even though another
person created it. This occurs most commonly when an employee creates
a work during a formal employment relationship and within the scope of
the employment.421 The formal employment relationship, once shown to
exist, results in the presumptive transfer of authorial causation from the
employee to the employer. Transferred causation thus operates like a
presumption, but instead of presuming causation from either status or
individual acts, it merely transfers the causation from one party to
another if causation is shown to exist.422
When an employee is causally responsible (epistemically and
evaluatively) for a work that she creates during the course of her
employment, and such creation falls within the scope of the employment,
the employer—and not the employee (the actual creator)—is treated as
the author of the work as a matter of law.423 One might posit a variety of
different causal explanations for this presumption, such as the possibility
that the conditions and terms of employment were the real cause for the
work, that it was the employment relationship that motivated the creation
of the work, or that the employer’s choice of the particular employee was
the real sine qua non of the work. However, the analytical structure of
the transfer tracks a largely analogous mechanism in the law of torts:
vicarious liability.
Premised on the principle of respondeat superior, vicarious liability
holds an employer (or principal) legally responsible for the actions of an
employee (or agent) when the act in question was committed during the
subsistence of the relevant legal relationship between the parties.424
Scholars have attempted to rationalize the doctrine in different ways for
some time now,425 and the principal justification that appears to hold
420. Id. § 101 (defining the term “work made for hire”).
421. See 1 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 28, § 5.03[B][1][b][I] (noting that
“[o]rdinarily” the employer and employee “assume ownership in the employer,” although
they “do not attempt to define with exact precision” which works will qualify).
422. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (“In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or
other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of
this title . . . .”).
423. See id.
424. For an overview of vicarious liability in tort law, see P.S. Atiyah, Vicarious Liability
in the Law of Torts (1967); T. Baty, Vicarious Liability (1916); J.B. Hodge, Vicarious
Liability (1986).
425. See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.04 cmt. b (Am. Law Inst. 2006)
(“Respondeat superior creates an incentive for principals to choose employees and
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sway is the argument that vicarious liability—at least in its core form—
operates as a risk-spreading mechanism, even if certain aspects of the
doctrine are hard to explain using this economic theory.426 Nevertheless,
even purely instrumental accounts of vicarious liability readily admit that
the doctrine embodies a presumption about causal transfer, which
Professor Alan Sykes has described as “enterprise causation.”427 As Sykes
describes it, the enterprise (employer) is causally related to the harm
caused by an employee under the theory that the “dissolution of the
enterprise and the subsequent unemployment of the employee would
reduce the probability of the wrong to zero.”428 The employer’s actions—
of employing the specific employee—are thus treated as a but-for cause
of the employee’s behavior, which in turn caused the wrong at issue. But
for the employment relationship, the employee is unlikely to have caused
the harm.
It is crucial to recognize that unlike presumed causation, transferred
causation does not assume away causation altogether using a proxy.
Instead, transferred causation still demands proving that the employee
was causally responsible in an epistemic and evaluative manner (i.e.,
cause in fact and proximate cause) for the injury produced.429 But when
these elements are satisfied—as they relate to the employee—causal
responsibility is automatically transferred to the employer. So it is with
the work made for hire doctrine as well. Once a party shows that the em-
ployee was causally responsible for the production of a work in both
epistemic and evaluative respects, the causation—and not just ownership
of the work—moves from the employee to the employer. The first step of
the analysis requires ascertaining whether the employee was the authorial
cause of the work, for which the standard framework of copyrightable
causation might be fruitfully employed. After this threshold is crossed,
the next step is to determine if that causation occurred during the
subsistence of the employment relationship and whether it was within the
structure work within the organization so as to reduce the incidence of tortious
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scope of the employment. When both are answered in the affirmative,
the causation is transferred to the employer.
Much like with vicarious liability, the logic for transferred causation
in copyright appears to have little to do with causation itself in the strict
sense—in either epistemic or evaluative terms. It instead derives from
considerations that are largely symmetrical to those within tort law.
Whereas tort law focuses on risk spreading and distributed deterrence in
its use of vicarious liability, one might understand copyright law as
encouraging greater risk taking and expanding its set of creator
incentives through the work made for hire doctrine by offering to treat
employers as authors. Neither doctrine has a real causal basis for its
functioning, yet both presumptively transfer causal responsibility from
one actor to another after its subsistence is proven.
CONCLUSION
Causation has always been an integral part of copyright law’s basic
entitlement structure, even if only rarely acknowledged as such. The
institution’s constitutional commitment to authorship—as both a status
(“author”) and a process (“authoring”)—requires paying close attention
to the way in which a work is created and then ascribed to an identified
human agent. Causal intuitions therefore inevitably influence the way in
which courts and scholars choose to identify the author of a work, intui-
tions that are capable of being systematized under the rubric of “autho-
rial causation.” Nonetheless, the reality remains that causal principles
rarely ever rise to the surface as an overt part of copyright reasoning.
They instead lurk in the shadows of copyright law’s various other
doctrines that purport to perform principally noncausal functions, which
has allowed copyright jurisprudence to overlook the role and influence
of causation in the construction of authorship. Copyright jurisprudence
would therefore benefit significantly from a direct engagement with
authorial causation—an engagement that would inject a measure of
analytical coherence and normative consistency into important aspects of
copyright doctrine. An independent requirement of “copyrightable
causation” that a plaintiff would need to establish as part of the
copyrightability determination would go a long way in realizing this.
Tracking copyright’s basic intuitions about authorial causation, the
requirement of copyrightable causation would consist of two elements.
The first, which would focus on the epistemic dimension of causation
and rely principally on fact-finding, would seek to identify the human
agent responsible for bringing the work into existence. Once the human
agency is identified in the first step, the second step would then evaluate
whether that agency was normatively sufficient to merit legal characteri-
zation as the authorial cause and thereby lead to the status of “author”
for the identified agent. Built on the analytical logic of tort law’s causal
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inquiry, copyrightable causation would thus recognize that authorial
causation involves both descriptive and evaluative dimensions and that,
while the two cannot be completely disentangled, one can nonetheless
sequence their relative contributions to the analysis in a way that renders
one more salient than the other in each step. Such sequencing would
also allow copyright law to embrace its normative pluralism through the
deployment of suitable midlevel principles during the analysis.
Developing a requirement of copyrightable causation, modeled on
tort law’s rules about causation, would also affirm the ideas that
copyright law and policy can benefit from looking to different areas of
the common law for its functioning and that courts have an important
role to play in reforming aspects of the copyright system even if the
system is principally statutory in origin. To the extent that the Copyright
Act—and the Constitution—confirm the centrality of “authorship” to
copyright law but then leave it up to the courts to ultimately determine
the precise contours of that idea, courts should be willing to embrace the
lawmaking role that the system consciously delegates to them. And in so
doing, they would do well to look to analogous ideas and concepts that
courts have developed and employed with fecundity in other areas. The
principles of causation represent one such domain, in which logic,
theory, and practice serve as convenient guides.
